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*THE
AMERICAN INDIAN
AS A SEA-FIGHTER
IN COLONIAL TIMES*



By Horace P. Beck

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The chart prepared by Cyprian Southack of the North American coast as far south as Florida.
 With charts such as these the English cruised the entire coast in fog and all weathers.

Courtesy of The John Carter Brown Library, Brown University,
 Providence, R. I.

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Dedicated to the memory of

ENSIGN CHARLES D. WRIGHT

Lost at sea, January, 1944

I E D G E O F T I M E & S E A

The Indian as a Mariner and Boatbuilder

The first Indian the Puritans spoke to after landing at Cape Cod had just paddled alone, and in the winter, from Monhegan Island a hundred-odd sea miles away. Despite this fact, to most people the American Indian was a man of the woods, the lakes, and the streams. A hunter supreme and an enemy feared for his ability as an ambusher, the Indian is seldom thought of as being a skillful, daring and resourceful seaman. A common concept has him paddling his canoe across a solitary inland lake or shooting a white rapid in his slim, frail craft. Yet, for some strange reason, very few people envision this same Indian paddling on salt water, much less fighting on it.

Why Indians and salt water are never associated in the public mind is a problem in national folklore beyond the scope of this paper to explore. Rather, the purpose here is to consider the Indians of the northeast coast, from New York to Newfoundland, first as seamen but primarily as sea-fighters from the earliest days of contact with Europeans to 1726—the somewhat arbitrary end of this discussion. In order to do this we must begin by considering the types of watercraft indigenous to this area, their construction, their means of propulsion, the uses they were put to, their development over the years, and to a certain extent the ecology of the various tribes concerned. Seamanship is usually born of necessity. Coupled with the type of vessel used, seamanship determines both the type of tactics employed and the success of any nautical engagement. Did the Indian make sea voyages before the coming of the whites; could he sail; did he ever fight on the water? These are all questions the answers to which have a very definite bearing on the main theme of this study.

The problem of whether or not these coastal Algonquins knew how to sail before the white man came to this continent is a question that has been discussed by scholars for some time without much conclusive evidence either pro or con. Unfortunately, most of the scholars who attacked this idea were not seafaring men and, therefore, speculated primarily on evidence gleaned from early narratives of Europeans who visited this continent. As a matter

of fact, this whole idea of the Indian of the northeast being a sea-fighter has never been fully discussed.

If a person can sail a small boat it is but an early step upward to handle a large vessel. Just as children today are taught first to sail dinghies and then to graduate to bigger boats, so it has always been in the past. If this was the practice of the white man, it stands to reason that it was the practice of other peoples. However, although the ability to handle a canoe in a stream or in the salt bays would be of some service to one attempting to work a sailing vessel offshore, it would not be sufficient—canoeing offshore would be of more benefit. Only by sailing small craft on the ocean could one become adequately prepared to meet the contingencies that arise when handling larger wind-driven ships. Let us examine the earliest accounts and attempt to find the range of the Indian as a seafarer during the initial days of contact.

We have, briefly, the following types of boats in the area under discussion, Newfoundland to New York—dugouts, birch, elm, and spruce bark canoes and skin boats. All of them appear to have been of the canoe type but each tribe had certain modifications in design which suited the particular conditions under which the craft were most often used.

The Birch-bark Canoe

Of all the materials used in construction, birch bark seems to have been the most popular, ranging from Newfoundland southwest to New Hampshire or as far as the range of the canoe birch-growing area. Further, many were probably traded south of this area. In Southern New England, where the birch did not grow, the dugout and the elm-bark canoe were used. Both of these latter types were heavy and hard to carry, but the dugout, at least, had the great advantage of being larger and more durable than the birch type.

Also the natives of southern New England did not appear to have been as migratory as, say, the Indians of Maine who lived on the coast in the summer and spent the winter inland hunting moose and caribou. Since these migrations were made primarily by canoe they had to have a boat light enough to portage easily from stream to lake and around rapids as they followed the waterways. In Rhode Island and on Long Island Sound the people appear to have lived in one area more or less permanently and used their canoes to go fishing or out to the islands like Martha's Vineyard, Block Island and Long Island. Once there, all they needed to do was to haul the boats ashore and leave them. Let us now look at the design and construction of these various types.

It is most fortunate that we have a number of very good accounts of the methods and materials, both ancient and contemporary, used in the construction of these craft from Newfoundland, from Nova Scotia, from Maine and Rhode Island south into Connecticut. There is also a considerable amount of miscellaneous data, both contemporary and ancient, for the whole region that helps to fill in missing details.



The Beothuk Canoe of the Newfoundland and Cape Breton Indian. Model now in Royal Scottish Museum, originally from Ethnographic Collection of Edinburgh University, and over a century old.

Courtesy of Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh

The Beothuk Canoe

Perhaps the most radical of all the canoe designs in this area was that used by the Beothuk in Newfoundland. These boats were about fourteen feet long with an extreme beam of about four feet. Both stem and stern were plumb and flaring and a cross section of the hull revealed that they were built on a "V" mould without any tumble-home above the waterline. Further, they had a small rocker keel and there was a raised section amidships on each side which strengthened the canoe immeasurably, preventing her from working and keeping her from hogging. Obviously such a design would not stay afloat without capsizing. To prevent this they were ballasted heavily with stone chinked with moss to prevent shifting when the boat rolled. The result of this architecture was to produce a canoe that was of deep draft and one that was an able sea boat.¹

The Micmac Canoe

A good deal more conventional was the Micmac canoe, although it had its own individual characteristics, as do all types of canoes built by in-

dividual tribes. The Micmac had a considerable tumble-home and an extremely high and full bow and stern section with a reverse curve on both members. So great was their tumble-home that it precluded the need of a gunwale and served as a washboard in a sea. Unlike the Beothuk canoe, this craft was flat-bottomed, of shoal draft, and devoid of either keel or ballast. Although the larger models were capable of carrying as many as eight people, they could not have been very stable for the above reasons. Thanks to N. Denys, we have an excellent early account of these canoes and their construction.

"For making their canoes they sought the largest birch trees they could find. They removed the bark of the length of the canoe which was of three to four fathoms and a half. The breadth was about two feet in the middle and always diminished towards the two ends, falling away to nothing. The depth was such that for a man seated it came up to his armpits. The lining for strengthening it was of slats, of the length of the canoe and some four inches broad, lessening towards the ends in order that they might match together. On the inside the canoe was lined with them completely, as well as all along it from one end to the other. These slats were made of Cedar, which is light, and which they split in as great length as they wished, and also as thin as they pleased. They also made from the same wood half circles to form ribs, and gave them their form in the fire.

For sewing the canoe, they took roots of Fir of the thickness of the little finger, and even smaller; they were very long. They split these roots into three or four parts, that is the largest ones. These split more easily than the Osiers used in making baskets. They made these into packages, which they placed in the water for fear lest they might dry up. There were also necessary two sticks of the length of the canoe, entirely round, and of the thickness of a large cane, and four other shorter sticks of Beech. All these things being ready, they took their bark and bent and fixed it in the form the canoe should have; then they placed the two long pieces all along and sewed them to the rim inside with these roots.

To sew they pierced the bark with a punch of pointed bone and passed through the hole an end of the wicker, drawing and tightening the stick against the bark as closely as they could, and always enwrapping the stick with the wicker so that they were in contact with one another. The sticks being well sewed on all along, they placed also the smaller pieces of beech crosswise, one in the middle, entering at its two ends into holes which were made in the pieces with which the canoe is rimmed, and three others in front of it, distant a half a fathom from one another, which lessened in length with the shape of the canoe. Three others were also placed backward at the same distances. All these pieces sewed all along the canoe, to which they were so firmly attached on both sides that the canoe could neither enlarge nor narrow.

Then are placed in position those big slats with which they lined all the interior of the canoe from top to bottom, and they were all made to touch one another. To hold them in place, they put over them those half circles, the ends of which were brought to join on both sides below those pieces which were sewn all around on the top. They drove these in with force, and they lined all the canoe with them from one end to the other. This made the canoe stiff to such a degree that it did not yield at any point.

There were seams in it, for in order to narrow it at the two ends, they split the bark from above downwards; they then overlapped the two edges one over the other, and sewed them. But to prevent the seams from admitting water, the women and girls chewed the gum of the Fir every day until it became a salve which they applied by aid of fire all along the seams, and this tightened them better than pitch. All this being done, the canoe was finished, and it was so light that a single man could carry it on his head."²

From this early account of Denys we become cognizant of the vast amount of labor involved in the manufacture of this type of boat and also we have a point of departure from which we may evaluate any changes that took place in canoe construction between then and now.

The Malecite and Penobscot Canoe

Further to the west we come upon the Malecite canoe which marks the transition between the Micmac and Penobscot types. The Malecite boat had a little less tumble-home than the Micmac; the bow was lower, with less reverse sheer than the Micmac, but with considerably more than was to be found among the Penobscot. It too was flat-bottomed and lacked a keel.

We next come to the Penobscot canoe which appears to have been used from the St. Croix river to New Hampshire (the southern extremity of the region in which the canoe birch grew. South of this area other material had to be used). Like the Micmac, Malecite, and Beothuk boats, the size of the Penobscot wherries (as the colonists called them) were determined by the trees available but seem to have been about eighteen feet overall with an extreme beam of thirty inches. The bow and stern had about a six inch dead rise and there was little or no tumble-home, the extreme beam being at the gunwale.³

Since the ecology of the country determined the type of vessel that the native could build, we find that from the Bay of Islands (Boston) southward to New York (beyond the range of the canoe birch), the elm-bark and the dugout canoes were of prime importance—this despite the fact that birch-bark canoes were probably traded into the area.

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A Malecite Canoe. Note the bow design and the flat bottom. Also note lack of decoration.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.



A typical Penobscot Bark Canoe and the oldest bark canoe in existence. This canoe dates from the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

Dugout and Skin Canoes

Thanks to Roger Williams and Verrazzano, we are able to tell a good deal about the dugout south of Cape Cod. From other sources we learn that English prisoners around Boston were forced by their Indian captors to construct dugouts which, in all likelihood, were similar to the boats mentioned by Williams in Rhode Island. Williams informs us that these boats were made either from oak, pine, or chestnut. An Indian would go into the forest with his tools and provisions and select a tree. After felling the tree, a combination of firing, hot stones and gouging would then be employed to shape and hollow the log into a dugout. During the entire procedure, which took from ten to twelve days, the native would remain by his work, the result of which would produce a boat capable of holding from three to forty people.⁴

More than a hundred years prior to Williams, Verrazzano had this to say concerning dugouts in Narragansett Bay. "They make their barges from the trunk of a single tree hollowed out in which XIV-XV men will

go comfortably, the short oar broad at one end working it solely with the strength of arms at sea without any peril with as much speed as pleases them."⁵ From these two accounts it can be seen how little the boats of southern New England changed through the years.

Used in conjunction with these dugouts was the elm-bark canoe. Although they were heavy and hard to handle owing to the thickness and roughness of the bark, they were easy to construct for it took only about two hours to make one.⁶ Further, since they are not mentioned in the earlier accounts, we should consider them as a late adaptation and a poor one.

Besides the canoes already mentioned there still remain two others that must not be overlooked—the spruce-bark and the skin canoes. Of the two, the skin canoes appear to have been not only the most important but the most common, inasmuch as they were used by the Beothuk,⁷ the Micmac and the Malecite.

Rand has this to say concerning a skin boat used by the Micmac to carry home a rescued Cheeno in a folktale. "It was not covered with birch bark, the usual material for shipbuilding, but with the more unusual kind—the skin of a moose; the craft thus formed being called a moosoolk (moose ship)."⁸

Giles, during his captivity among the Malecites, saw these skin boats made and used and has left us a sketchy picture of how they were built. Finding themselves on the bank of a stream down which they wished to travel they constructed a canoe of moose skins by sewing three or four skins together over a frame and caulking the seams with a preparation of charcoal and balsam.⁹

From the above remarks we are led to infer that the skin canoe was an unusual "jury-built" craft, used primarily upon inland waters when the normal type canoe was absent. The Micmacs called it an unusual conveyance, Giles speaks of it as a "jury boat" and a Malecite tale recounts how Asa, a trickster, built one and infers that such craft definitely were abnormal.¹⁰

However, in direct opposition to these statements, Speck avers that the Micmacs "use raised gunnel boats and mooseskin boats (musqwulk) which are quickly made." He further adds that an informant told him of canoes fifteen feet long and two and a half feet wide made of caribou and seal skins stretched on a frame and the seams made water-tight through sewing. The bow and stern of these boats were straightened by using spruce bark. The whole canoe was covered with a loose skin decking except for the paddler in the stern who could wrap it around himself if necessary.

In these craft the Micmac made long ocean trips subsisting on seals and porpoises.¹¹ When we note how Speck's description of the construction of these boats parallels that of Giles we may reasonably infer that the moosook was probably used, if only sparingly, during the early contact period as a means of salt water transport.

There is only one available reference to spruce-bark canoes and that is in the form of a folktale from the Malecite. Here we are told that the trickster Lox built himself a canoe of spruce bark in which to hunt beaver.¹² Inasmuch as Lox is a trickster, the fact that he built a canoe of spruce bark might well be construed as abnormal and not what the Indian would normally use. It might well be considered analogous to Gluskap's building a stone canoe and should be taken with a grain of salt.

Sailing the Canoe

In the foregoing discussion we have covered all the major canoe types in the area and their construction. It now remains to be seen if these vessels were propelled solely by paddles or if they sometimes used sails. In the earliest accounts there is no mention whatever made of sails although there are numerous accounts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that refer to canoes carrying sails. Williams states that the natives often hoisted bits of clothing on a slim pole to enable them to run before the wind and later states that two Indians were drowned in Narragansett Bay when their canoe capsized in a squall near Mt. Hope.¹³ Cartwright says that the Beothuk carried a square sail on a stayed mast amidships but that they used it only in mild weather with a following breeze.¹⁴ Lescarbot tells us that he saw an Indian canoe running in the Bay of Chaleur under a skin square sail on which was painted the figure of a moose.¹⁵ Denys, writing in 1650 says, "... went with sail which was formerly of bark but oftener of a well dressed moose skin. Had they a favorable breeze they went as swiftly as the throw of a stone."¹⁶

Another writer to mention sailing canoes was John Josselyn. Unfortunately this author had a tendency to enlarge on the truth and it is to be suspected that this is a case in fact. While lying at anchor in Boston harbor in the middle Sixteen Hundreds he noted, "In the afternoon I returned to our ship, being no sooner aboard but we had sight of an Indian Pinnace sailing by us made of Birchbark, sewed together with the roots of Spruce and white Cedar (drawn out into threads) with a deck, trimmed with sails, top and top-gallant very sumptuously."¹⁷

It is to be noted that all of these accounts occur relatively late in the contact period. About all that we can say is that by the beginning of the

seventeenth century the Indians were beginning to use sails to run before the wind, a rather natural thing for anyone to do who went out in any sort of boat. Had these remarks been made early in the 1500's they still would not have proved that sailing was not an accepted skill. No one can say with any definiteness exactly when the first contacts were made between Europeans and Indians.

However, the foregoing discussion of design and construction of the native craft should give us the answer. The canoes, except possibly for the Beothuk, were never designed to carry sails and did so only with extreme peril of capsizing. There are many reasons why this is true but the prime reasons are that the canoes were lightly built (except for the dugouts) and were flat-bottomed and lacked any form of keel. Although they might run off the wind they could not go to windward. Any attempt to have done so would have caused them either to capsize, be torn apart from the strain of the mast, or, at best, to go sideways. Even running before the wind they would have been unsatisfactory, save in the gentlest breezes, for the shape of the stem would have tended to cause them to "trip," broach and capsize. Therefore, we can safely say that sailing, except in a haphazard manner off the wind, was an acculturated skill. Yet these Indians were at home on salt water. As we shall see, they were capable of making the long passage, and in all, were excellent small boat handlers.

The Range of the Indian Traveller by Sea

According to the late Frank Speck, the Micmac used to paddle across the Bay of Fundy to summer on the Maine coast. To do this they would send their strongest paddlers in small canoes from the Nova Scotia shore to the islands lying off the Maine coast where they would light beacon fires to direct the rest of the band, who came after them, in larger, slower canoes. Joe Charles, a Micmac, told the author in 1933 that as a boy, fifty years before, he and his father used to harpoon porpoise from canoes in the Bay of Fundy—no mean trick in itself. But this is recent history.

The natives of Maine and Nova Scotia appear to have been highly nomadic.¹⁸ Their winters were spent inland where they subsisted on big game and their summers were spent on the coast where they depended on marine life for sustenance. The principal means of transportation on these migrations was the canoe. It is interesting to note that the various canoe designs mentioned earlier were, in all probability, an outgrowth of the type of water encountered on these yearly migrations. In Maine the streams were swift and full of white water. Thus a wide flaring bow and sides would be invaluable in running rapids although not quite so satis-

factory on the ocean. In New Brunswick the streams were less turbulent and, therefore, the Penobscot design was not so necessary. In Nova Scotia, where the majority of the streams are sluggish, the Micmac were able to build primarily for the salt water.

It would be absurd to think that the natives, once they reached the coast, would content themselves with what was to be found in the bays and along the shore when out in deep water were to be found pods of whales, schools of porpoise and herds of seals ready for the taking. There is considerable evidence found in archeological sites that these creatures formed a not inconsiderable part of the native diet.

We know that the Indians inhabited most of the larger islands like Long Island, Block Island, Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and Monhegan Island. Early historical accounts tell of whale skeletons being found on the beaches of some of these southern islands. Rosier's account of Weymouth's voyage in 1605 tells of Indians taking Whales with harpoons.¹⁹ Further, Banks states that the Indians of Martha's Vineyard taught the whites how to capture whales.²⁰ Nor are these the only references; there are many others. In 1725 the governor of Massachusetts sent out letters releasing the Barnstable Indians in order that they might return home in time for the fall whale fishery.²¹

The Indians First Recorded Contact With Europeans

Although there is a good deal more evidence that could be brought forth to show the native ability of these people on the ocean it seems hardly worth while. The Beothuk traveled to Nova Scotia, the Micmac migrated to Maine and the Indians of New England spent much of their time on islands that lay from ten to fifteen miles offshore and harpooned whales when the occasion arose. People who could do these things had to be good boat handlers and were daring enough to wage war against the English and Europeans in general once they had overcome the initial shock of seeing these foreign ships. Just how quickly that shock wore off we shall soon see.

From Howley we are given an abstract from the voyage of one Gaspar de Cortereal who touched on Newfoundland in the year 1500. While there he improved the shining hour by capturing fifty-seven natives whom he shipped back to Europe. Concerning the natives he has this to say, "... There has been brought hence a piece of broken sword inlaid with gold which we can pronounce to have been made in Italy and one of the children had in his ears two pieces of silver which appear to have certainly been



The schooner Baltick, typical of the type used in the fishing and coasting trade during the 18th century. In a vessel similar to this, the Indians defeated a pair of colonial privateers under the commands of Lakeman and Dr. Jackson.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

made in Venice—which induces me to believe that that country belongs to the continent.¹¹²²

This broken sword and the two coins stand on the outermost shoal of history, almost obscured by the mist of the years. How these artifacts came into the hands of the Beothuk we will never know for a certainty, but we may be sure of two things—someone landed on Newfoundland before Cortereal (someone of distinction if the inlaid sword means anything) and never returned to Europe. When this happened, whether a ship was wrecked and bodies came ashore, or whether some storm-driven ship seeking shelter was overpowered by the natives must remain a mystery. However, our next accounts are somewhat clearer.

Martin Frobisher was the next man to land on Newfoundland and leave an account which is of interest to us here. He gave presents to the natives but, despite friendly overtures on their part, he didn't trust them.

Contrary to orders, five men slipped into the longboat and went off with the friendly Beothuk. Neither boat nor men were ever seen again.²³ The Indians had taken their first European boat.

In 1594 Captain Rice Jones came to Newfoundland to fish. There were a number of French vessels lying off Placentia so Jones went elsewhere. As the Englishman lay at anchor with sixty other vessels near the shore, the natives slipped upon him in the night and cut both his boats adrift and made off with them.²⁴

To be sure these are only three longboats taken by the natives, with a remote possibility that a larger vessel had been taken earlier, but these things happened long before the average person of today realizes white men were in the area. From these small beginnings in Newfoundland a tree was soon to grow that would bear bitter fruit further to the south.

First Hostilities—The Indian Fights Back

When Bartholomew Gosnold arrived at a spot somewhere near the Isles of Shoals one misty morning in May of the year 1602, he was surprised to see a Basque shallop near the shore. According to Gabriel Archer, a gentleman aboard the *Concord*, "From the said rock came towards us a Biscay shallop with sayle and oars having eight persons in it, whom we supposed at first to be Christians distressed. But approaching closer we perceived them to be savages—One that seemed to be the commander wore a waistcoat of black work, a pair of britches, cloth stockings, shoes, hat and band, one or two more had also one or two things made by some Christians; these with a piece of chalk described the coasts thereabouts and could name Placentia of the Newfoundland."²⁵ From further accounts we learn that the shallop was fully found and that her crew knew how to handle her.

From this amazing discovery in 1602 we learn many things. These natives on the coast of Maine (and these men are to be assumed to be natives since they appear to have resembled the other people Gosnold saw there) knew the country as far as Newfoundland, almost a thousand miles away, and were capable of handling a substantial vessel. Perhaps they had even sailed that far in her. Further, we may be reasonably sure that the shallop being in their possession was neither the result of a shipwreck—else she would not have been fully found—nor was she a gift from a philanthropic Basque, for a vessel of her size would have been a very valuable asset to any stranger on the coast. Why make a present of a fully found shallop when a handful of beads would have bought all of New England? We must, therefore, assume that the vessel was a prize of war. Whether she



Typical Passamoquoddy Canoe in Peabody Museum. Note designs on the ends and the difference in shear between this and Penobscot.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

was taken on the high seas, while at anchor, or whether the crew was liquidated while ashore we do not know. In all probability the latter was the case as subsequent events will show.

In the year 1609, Henry Hudson was forced to cut himself a new foremast somewhere near Penobscot Bay. Because of fog, he was detained somewhat, and the natives began coming from the surrounding country to view his vessel and her crew. On July twentieth the Europeans were amazed to see two French shallops coming toward them. Like Gosnold, they probably expected to meet Frenchmen, but the two shallops were full of "the country people."²⁶

Although it will always remain a mystery as to exactly how these vessels came into the hands of the natives, we are left in little doubt concerning three longboats in 1608. In that year an English colony had been set up at the mouth of the Kennebec. The English there abused the natives in various ways until hostilities broke out. One day, three longboats with eleven men were sent out fishing. The natives came alongside under the pretense of trading and boarded the three boats. Knives flashed and in a few minutes eleven white men had been killed and three English longboats were in the hands of the natives. What use the Indians made of their prizes we do not know.²⁷

In 1611 we meet with further news of sea battles between Europeans and Indians. Captain Edward Harlowe arrived at Monhegan Island and sought to shanghai five natives to take to England. For a time he was unsuccessful, but eventually he caught three Indians named Pechmo, Epenow, and Monopet. Pechmo, however, managed to escape by diving overboard. For some reason he appears to have resented this attempt on his liberty and raised the populace who attacked the vessel. While the assault was in progress a native swam out and cut the painter on the longboat which drifted ashore. Immediately the natives hauled her up on the shingle and resisted all attempts to retake her. Before the fight was

over, three of the English were severely wounded by arrows. As a result of this incident the country flocked to arms and when the English next made a landfall they were attacked by Indians in canoes who were dispersed only with cannon fire.²⁸

Here again we see the importance the natives placed on the European vessels. It would have been an easy task to have burned, sunk or stove the longboat. Instead they went to extreme lengths to save her intact for their own use, and since a canoe was about as seaworthy as a longboat and much more maneuverable, we must conclude that they wanted her for some particular purpose as for instance, a warship.

At Cape Cod Harlowe took more prisoners but was finally forced to clear out. The results of his and other depredations on the coast during this early period were, before long, to have serious results.

The next man to have trouble with the Indians was Captain Hobson who arrived on the coast in 1614 with Epenow as interpreter. In some manner Epenow seems to have made his plight known to his countrymen for he dove overboard when the vessel was surrounded by twenty canoes. His friends immediately laid down such a barrage of arrows on the ship that the crew were pinned to the deck and prevented from making any attempt to recapture him. Epenow escaped.²⁹

In this same year Captain John Smith was attacked at Cohasset. The Indians used a technique, that, although unsuccessful in his case, in another half century was to give better results. Having had an altercation with the natives ashore Smith rowed away and as he passed some rocks outside the harbor his boat was fired upon with but little effect.³⁰

So far Indian attacks had proved little more than a nuisance to Europeans, although in thirty-seven years they had accounted for the lives of at least sixteen Englishmen, wounded two others and taken two shallops and seven longboats. However, the only real danger seemed to lie in not being vigilant. The Europeans seem to have needed more than the threat of Indian arrows to make them realize this necessity. Yet, even in this early period the natives showed conclusively that when sufficiently aroused they could be truly dangerous. In fact it seems likely that had they wished they could have taken Hobson's vessel. Within three years time they were destined to show just how dangerous they could be.

In 1616 a French vessel was caught in a storm and lost on Cape Cod. Remembering what had happened to their friends a few years before, the natives on the Cape killed all but one of the survivors; he married one of their women and lived with them.³¹ The following year another French vessel put into Cape Cod to trade. The natives swarmed aboard to

barter bringing with them their furs and their knives. When the work was over the ship belonged to the Indians and no Frenchmen were left to tell the tale. Apparently not knowing what to do with her they took what plunder they wanted and then burned her at anchor.³² In two short years the Indians had begun to avenge themselves for the early treatment afforded them by the Europeans. From this time on except for brief interludes, eternal vigilance was the only safety factor for a ship on the New England coast, and often that was not enough.

Following these two attacks hostilities seem to have ceased, except for one incident, for a dozen years. This may have been caused by an epidemic of smallpox that broke out in 1618 which so decimated the native population that resistance to the whites became virtually impossible. The death of the French traders under Captain Finch marked the last successful marine hostility in what might well be termed the first stage of Indian marine warfare. This period was marked by sporadic attacks by ill-equipped natives who managed to succeed only through weight of numbers or by extreme cunning. When the battle was resumed it was to take on a far more intense character.

II THE STORM GATHERS STRENGTH

During the peaceful years following 1618 one abortive attempt at naval warfare was launched. Shortly after the Pilgrims landed, another party of English under Colonel Weston attempted a settlement in Massachusetts Bay. For a number of reasons, unimportant to us at the moment, the colony failed to take root and the whites, in order to survive, had to depend upon the Indians who appear to have made them virtual slaves. While in this condition the natives, according to Mather, set them to making canoes to attack an English vessel lying offshore. In all probability the "canoes" were longboats, for the English would have had little skill whatever in building the native craft. However, the venture came to naught and must be considered only as a formulating idea rather than an accomplished fact.³³


In 1631 the Tarratines, a term applied loosely to Eastern Indians in general, began a series of amphibious raids that were to continue intermittently for the next hundred years. Canoe loads of warriors would slip down the coast at night, land and strike at sunrise an outlying town or house, destroy it, return to their canoes and vanish. In many respects this type of warfare was the most successful of all the methods devised by the Indians.

During the winter of 1631-32 the Tarratines fell in with a boat belonging to Mr. Henry Way of Dorchester. They attacked the vessel and killed her crew of five, among whom was Mr. Way's son. In order apparently, to conceal their action they sank the boat by loading her full of stones.³⁴ How she was taken we do not know, but it served as a grim reminder that white men ought not to go about the water without taking all precautions.

As time went on, Indian attacks increased on land until the stage was set for the first real full scale Indian war in New England, the Pequot war which began in 1634. Strangely enough the incidents which were directly responsible for the war's outbreak were a series of sea tragedies, two of which took place with men who were, at best, one jump ahead of the Massachusetts Bay Colony's sheriff.

Captain Stone, one late summer's day, sailed into the Connecticut river to trade with the Indians. A short time before he arrived, according to the Indians, another vessel much resembling Stone's had entered the river to

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*To the Merchants of Boston this View of the LIGHT HOUSE
is most humbly presented. By their Humble Serv^t W^m Burris*

Believed by many to be a picture of the Province Galley when under command of Cyprian Southack off Boston Light, 1715.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

trade and greatly abused the natives. The captain's vessel seemed to them an excellent object for revenge. Accordingly they swarmed aboard, supposedly to trade, and fell upon the captain and his three-man crew. For what happened next we must rely upon the Indian account and read between the lines. The natives killed Stone and two of the crew members but one Norton gained the sanctuary of the magazine. (According to the English account, he barricaded himself in the galley until the galley stove set fire to a barrel of loose powder, which so burned him that he was unable to carry on his heroic resistance any longer. He was captured and later died of his wounds.)

This story doesn't seem to hold water. What was powder doing stored in the galley with the fire burning? In the whole ship the most dangerous place to store powder would be the galley. On the other hand the Indian

version states that he retreated to the magazine, the most impregnable spot in the entire ship. Feeling that all was lost, and reflecting that it would be better to trust himself to the dubious hereafter than the certain fate that awaited him at the hands of his enemies, he deliberately fired the magazine. At any rate the vessel and her crew were lost.³⁵ It is interesting to note that had Stone lived he would, in all probability, have been either imprisoned or gibbeted for the crime of piracy.³⁶

The Connecticut Indians Press the Attack

That same year a vessel owned by John Gallup senior was bound for Block Island with a crew of four to trade with the Indians. As they approached the island they noticed an English vessel sailing toward them making numerous yaws and luffs and acting generally in a strange manner. Immediately suspicious, Gallup closed with her and discovered that she was manned by Indians who were apparently, of a mind to attack him. Gallup fired a few rounds at the stranger which drove the Indians below. He then boarded the vessel, and, upon examining a head found in a purse seine hanging over the side, he discovered that he was aboard John Oldham's ship.³⁷ The head belonged to that worthy gentleman who had long been in the bad graces and often the gaols of the Puritans.³⁸ Oldham had been on a trading voyage to Block Island and had fallen with all his crew.³⁹ How the vessel was taken or for what reason we shall never know. Further, we will never know to what purpose the natives intended to put their prize although from the above statements there is some indication that they intended to fight her. On the other hand there is a good possibility that the victors were surprised before they had time to dispose of the craft.

Besides these two vessels there are a number of accounts that tell of other vessels taken, most of which are so vague as to be classified as rumors more than anything else. Yet where there is smoke there is usually fire and although many of these rumors were undoubtedly spread in an attempt to justify the atrocities perpetrated on the Pequots by the English, there undoubtedly was some truth in them. From Thomas Cobbet we learn that, "When in the same year thirty-five Sundrie English about Weathersfield, etc. were murdered by Indians whilst mowing, etc. others cut off at sea in their trading, as Mr. Oldham and his men and Mr. Tilley and his."⁴⁰ Mather reports merely that a shallop with a crew of three was taken on the Connecticut river, run ashore and burned.⁴¹ He also says that in 1633 a "barke" with a crew of twelve was taken, on the Connecticut. The vessel was burned and her crew killed.⁴² Bradford, after mentioning the fate of

Oldham continues, "... after ye English were returned, ye Pequents tooke their time and oppertunitie to cut of some of ye English as they passed in boats and went on fouling."⁴³ Josselyn mentions in passing that while he was in the country a vessel was taken on Martha's Vineyard, destroyed and her crew devoured by the natives.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, most of these vessels can not be traced. However, thanks to Gardner we do have a clear account of what happened to Mr. Tilley, otherwise known as Sergeant Kettle because he wore a brass pot on his head in battle when his helmet was missing.

Gardner tells us of the extreme caution used by the English on the Sound to prevent their vessels from being taken. (At night they lay offshore and during the day kept a strong guard posted below decks and then only approached the shore with caution.) He further relates that one Mitchell borrowed a shallop and went to Six Mile Island to fetch back a load of hay. The crew of four beached the boat and went ashore where they were immediately ambushed. Three men were killed and Mitchell's brother was roasted alive. What became of the shallop we are not told. Gardner further states that another shallop belonging to "old Mr. Mitchell" was taken as she sailed past this island with a load of hay. One man was killed by musket fire and the other member of her crew slain by an arrow through his head.⁴⁵

Although Bradford and others stated that Tilley was lost with his vessel, Gardner, who was an eye witness to the event in question, states that Tilley was killed with one of his crew while ashore. Gardner himself sent a shallop to recover the pink and bring her under the guns of his fort which was done before the natives were able to launch an attack against her.⁴⁶

Learning to Fight the White Man's Way

Mather, Josselyn and Bradford notwithstanding, the taking of Oldham's vessel seems to have been the last major marine assault in southern New England unless we accept the taking of Mr. Mitchell's shallop which was, after all, a considerably smaller vessel. Up to this time the most successful assaults had been carried on by these people—if we except the two Basque shallops taken in Maine. Why the natives did not persist in these attacks is hard to say, certainly not because of the difficulty involved in taking the vessels. It is significant, I think, to note that in every case the ships that these people took were destroyed soon after they became prizes, whereas in Maine and elsewhere to the eastward every effort was made to keep the prizes. Although one could claim ignorance of ship handling as a

reason for destroying Captain Finch's ship at Cape Cod, no such claim would be valid for Oldham's craft. After all, in fourteen years of close contact with the whites the natives ought to have learned something about ship handling.

Actually there were several rather satisfactory reasons why the Indians in this region did not attempt to keep these vessels. The land from Boston south to New York was relatively flat when compared to Maine. There were only a limited number of harbors available where a ship could be hidden and most of these had been occupied by the English. For over a hundred miles the water was a thoroughfare bounded on the seaside by Long Island and any enemy craft caught in these waters would have little chance of escaping her pursuers for she could only go north or south. Finally, there was a dearth of fog to hide the manoeuvres of a ship—a commodity to be found in abundance further to the eastward.

Besides these natural obstacles there were others just as important. The natives did not have any readily available source whence they could obtain so many of the essential supplies necessary to maintain even the smallest sailing vessels. Finally we come to the people themselves. These Indians, Pequots, Narragansetts, Wampanoags, and the rest were a fairly sedentary group of agrarian fishermen. The annals of the wars with them show a campaign that covered a limited territory. Once their towns were destroyed and their crops laid waste they were, to all intents and purposes, defeated. Unlike the eastern tribes, who, after their towns were destroyed, moved aboard ships and continued to fight for several years, these people do not seem to have been able to make such an adjustment. For them it would have been difficult, had the terrain been feasible, to have carried on the existence necessary to have made sea fighting successful. Therefore, since the coastline, the weather, the white population, the limited supplies available, and their own disinclination to wander all made marine warfare nonfeasible, it is little wonder that no attempts were made to take European-type vessels during the wars that followed—especially when one considers the difficulty involved in smoking the whites out of their floating forts.

If the natives of Connecticut did not distinguish themselves after this period the Indians in Maine and Cape Sable more than made up for their deficiencies. As the years passed their sudden and frequent amphibious attacks increased in savagery. They ravaged the islands and harried the coast; they surprised the fishermen and pursued the coasters with shocking success. However, these attacks did not materialize until the outbreak of

King Philip's war in 1675. By that time the natives had largely replaced their old bows with powder and ball and the wooden ships of the white man were rendered less formidable thereby.

Although it is true that, generally speaking, an uneasy truce prevailed from the close of the Pequot war on the mainland until the beginning of Philip's war it would not be wholly true to state that the period was without incidents of hostility on land and sea. The records mention incidental outbursts on land and there is at least one minor event recorded during the period that sheds some light on how conditions stood afloat.

During the winter of 1645 Joseph Grafton sailed from Salem bound for Port La Tour with a vessel loaded with supplies for the garrison there. Off Cape Sable he fell in with the Frenchman, D'Aulney, who took his ship and all her gear and marooned Grafton and his crew on an island where all they had for shelter was an old wigwam left behind by Indians. After ten days D'Aulney gave them a small shallop, without guns or compass and told them to make the best of their way home, which they did. On the way they were pursued by a party of Indians whom they managed to outsail and arrived in Salem without further incident shortly before April thirteenth.⁴⁷

In itself this incident is unimportant yet it marks one of the earliest instances of attacks by the Micmacs—attacks which were to become much more successful and grow increasingly frequent in the years to come. Further, the fact that Grafton was so distressed about being sent to sea without guns infers that he feared that he would be attacked by Indians before he reached home. (Pirates, his only other enemy, did not lurk on the coast in the winter time.) It is to be inferred that he had evidence at his disposal to make him fear such an attack.

The Colonials Organize a Punitive Expedition

Thirty years after the Grafton incident there was set in motion a series of events that are of considerable interest to us. In September, 1675, the colonists living around Portland became enraged by Indian depredations and proceeded to fit out a company of twenty-five men (a considerable army for that day) and embarking in a sloop and towing two boats they sailed for the Amonoscoggen (Androscoggin) river to steal Indian corn growing thereabouts. Anchoring the sloop, they hauled the two boats ashore and were busily engaged in plundering the corn when they saw three Indians. With the odds at eight to one the English attacked and killed one man, wounded another who fled across the river, while the third man

escaped and brought back reinforcements. According to Hubbard the battle was intense and the English, sadly mauled, abandoned the boats and fled into the sloop and sailed away. Of the two boats left ashore, "the Indians, presently burned one and plundered the other of all that was therein."⁴⁸

Somehow we can not be altogether satisfied with this account. Why did the Indians burn one boat and only plunder the other? Why didn't they burn both? For that matter how was it possible for the English to sail up to an Indian village, disembark twenty-five men and not be noticed? Why were reinforcements so readily available? Most important, how did twenty-five men, many of them wounded, get back aboard a sloop anchored in the stream if they left their boats behind?

The answers to these questions are simple. The English were seen; scouts were sent out and driven off, giving the natives good cause to fight. By this time the boats were loaded, making them slow and reducing the protective elements in them. However, when the attack began the English managed somehow to launch the boats and get aboard the sloop despite all efforts to stop them. Then, either because they were too hard pressed or because the boats were cut adrift, they left them behind.

Obviously the Indians had intended to take the sloop but had to content themselves with the boats, one of which appears to have been so badly damaged as to be unserviceable and was consequently burned. The other they kept but removed everything in her in case she was retaken before they could use her.

During this same month an amphibious attack was launched at Saco. A band of Indians crossed the river in "English canoes" and made a partially successful attack upon the town. After the battle they stove the bottoms out of the canoes, set them adrift, and departed overland. Perhaps the words "English canoes" meant exactly what they said, but in all probability they referred to some type of Colonial skiffs or pulling boats.⁴⁹

The next event of importance we hear in retrospect—as is so often the case. Two months after the Saco incident, November sixth, to be exact, the English report that they have recaptured a shallop near Piscatua. How, when, and where the Indians had taken this vessel would be hard to say.⁵⁰

At about this same time one Thomas Tucker and George Hiskett had completed the building of a ship at New Dartmouth. The vessel had been launched and was almost ready for sea. The crew were aboard finishing her fitting out when a raiding party fell upon the town and upon the new vessel. Although the crew put up a stiff resistance they were shortly driven off and the Indians took over. Whatever necessary last minute de-

tails were needed to fit her for sea the captors completed and the new crew ran her out of the harbor. What happened after that is a mystery but we learn that she finally fell in with Her Majesty's sloop of war "Mary" who was only able to take her after a pitched battle.⁵¹ It is such incidents as these, insignificant though they at first seem, that begin to show us the skill and courage and daring of these natives in sea attacks.

The Rogue Mog Captures a Ketch

The following year, 1676, the entire country was up and everywhere one looked the smoke rose from the ruins of English cabins or Indian villages. One incident of that year is of considerable importance to us. Some time before the abortive assault on the cornfield in '75 there appeared on the scene a nebulous figure who was known by the charming appellations of Mugg or Mog, to which name the English often added "the rogue" or worse. The name of this particular sagamore was to flit back and forth across the stage of the Indian wars for the next fifty years. Whether or not the same individual is always referred to is hard to say (especially when he is once reported killed in action) but the name keeps cropping up throughout the history of the wars with the Eastern Indians and always the role played was an important one.

In 1676 Black Point received one of its periodic visitations from the Indians and was sacked and destroyed. This so distressed the people of the Piscataua area that they found the suggestions of one Mr. Ghendal very pleasing when he proposed that a ship be sent to Richmond Island, a low, flattish isle slightly south of Cape Elizabeth (which makes the present Richmond Island Harbor) to see if they could salvage anything from the wrath of the Redmen. To this end a thirty-ton ketch belonging to Mr. Fryer was equipped and a large body of men went aboard.

Apparently Richmond Island was reached in safety on the twelfth of October, the anchor let go and a number of the party set ashore. About this time the wind hauled around and the ketch found herself lying on a lee shore in poor holding ground. To make matters worse, the party ashore was set upon by a large group of Indians, some of whom clambered into a staging near the shore and began to ply the ketch so hotly that the crew were driven from the deck. While the barrage from the staging was kept up, another group of Indians manned a canoe and cut the ketch's cable. The wind soon drove her ashore and the crew were given the choice of jumping overboard and being drowned, shot on sight, surrendering, or being burned

to death (for the natives threatened to fire the ketch if they didn't surrender). Of the four proposals they prudently chose to surrender, as they felt that course gave more chance to survive.⁵²

At this time the leader of the Indians appears to have been Mugg for we learn later that he returned Mr. Fryer, one of the prisoners.⁵³ Further, we learn that the destruction of a few white men was not the chief purpose behind the assault. Mugg kept some of the prisoners, at least, for ransom and what is even more important to us here is the fact that as soon as the weather moderated he had the ketch repaired and floated off. The location of this ketch was, for the next few months, to cause considerable unrest among the English.

Actually, from depositions made by the various prisoners upon their release we are able to piece together her career.

Once she was afloat and ready for sea a prize crew was put aboard and she was sailed to the Ship Cot (Sheepscott) river and laid up for the winter, the season being too far advanced for successful raiding on the coast, and probably also because she was out of ammunition. The following spring, however, the ketch was fitted out for sea and a crew of ten natives and with John Abbot, one of the prisoners, who was to serve as navigator and sailing master, the vessel was put to sea and run off in a southwesterly direction. Unfortunately, the ketch was caught in a heavy gale and driven into Cape Newagan where, for some reason, eight of the crew left her. Despite this fact there seems to have been some very definite plan afoot at that time for as soon as the weather moderated Abbot and his crew put to sea and continued on course until another gale drove them into Damariscove. Here they remained for a time and the other two Indians, for reasons unknown, left the ship and Abbot sailed her single-handed to the Isles of Shoals.⁵⁴

Towards a Rendezvous with Fate

It seems highly probable that the Fryer Ketch was sailing south for a rendezvous of some sort. This is the only explanation that sounds plausible enough to fit the cases. Two Indians could hardly hope to fight a ketch successfully, yet they kept her going south. In all probability the first gale delayed the party so long that there was some doubt as to whether or not the ketch could make the gathering. Eight of the Indians left in order to make the meeting and report the progress of the vessel. When the second storm delayed them still further the other two Indians abandoned the project entirely and left the ketch in Abbot's hands. Lest this be thought to be pure conjecture, there is some evidence to point to the accuracy of the above hypothesis.

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The month before Fryer's ketch was taken, according to Francis Card, then a prisoner, a large body of Indians divided into two groups and made amphibious attacks upon Jewel's Island in Casco Bay (where they killed the entire settlement) and Saga-da-hoc. Those that went to Saga-da-hoc were commanded by "Mugg, the rogue" and at that place they took a shallop and immediately departed for the Kennebec with all speed having been informed that a shallop and a ketch were lying there at Damariscove. The shallop they took, but the ketch got clear in a running fight that cost her two men.⁵⁵

All of these things add up to a single fact; Mugg was building up an Indian navy in the only manner open to him—by taking small vessels wherever possible. Further, he was not risking those vessels foolishly but secreting them until the moment when he could bring them out as a fleet. By the end of 1676 he had at least one boat, a thirty-ton ketch and two shallops, one of which was large enough to hold eighty men.

Francis Card declared that it was the express purpose of Mugg to "take vessels and go to all the fishing islands and soe drive the country before him in the spring."⁵⁶ At that time the fishing islands, Monhegan, Matinicus, and the Isles of Shoals were the centers of population in the eastern parts. Had his plan worked, Mugg probably would have been able to take the islands, build up his fleet, cut off the coasting trade which was the lifeline of the Colonials living in Maine, and actually drive the white men out of the country. With this accomplished, he would have been in a good position to carry out the second phase of professed plan, "to burn Boston." With the ships that would have been at his command after the successful completion of the first part of his scheme he might well have been able to occupy the outlying island off Boston, blockade the town and put the entire English cause in jeopardy.

Unfortunately for him three well-nigh insurmountable obstacles lay between him and success. Although he had plenty of men who could handle canoes, he did not have a considerable number of trained ship handlers which naturally would have been a necessity in an operation of this magnitude. Second, he lacked powder to work the heavy shipboard ordnance. Finally, time was against him. The English cause strengthened with every shipload of goods from England and every day his forces were being reduced on land.

How close this plan might have come to success we will never know, for while the Fryer ketch was attempting to make her rendezvous and perhaps set the plan in motion, fate intervened. The first American admiral was to fall upon evil times.

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Eighteenth-century illustration of an "American Bark boat," showing the rudimentary use of sail by the natives.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

The Indian Mariners Press the Attack

In the spring of 1677 the Indians ambushed nine soldiers on Arrowsick Island, killed six of them and took their boat. On May 16 another assault was launched on Black Point. During the engagement one Indian was seen to be particularly active and finally was shot and killed. According to accounts he was Mugg. (Actually there may be some doubt about this as someone with the same name was active during the next century.)

That summer the marine and land attacks were the worst in the hundred years of English occupation. Flushed with the successes achieved under Mugg, the natives drove home their assaults upon the English ships from Nova Scotia to Maine with redoubled fury and greater success. So intense were these attacks that the fishing fleets were practically driven from the seas

before the end of August. Chief among the marine marauders this time were the "Cape Sable Indians," the Micmacs.

Rather than attempt to enumerate all the ships taken that year let us look at one town primarily. For the town of Salem, Massachusetts this was indeed a black year. By July twenty-fifth a total of no less than thirteen ketches had been taken by the Indians, principally around Cape Sable. So disturbed was the town that the following report was made by the church that summer. "The Indians having taken no less than thirteen ketches of Salem and captivated the men, though divers of them cleared themselves and come home, it struck great consternation into all the people here and it was agreed that the lecture day be kept as a fast—the Lord was pleased to send in some of the ketches on the fast, which was looked upon as a gracious smile of Providence; also nineteen men had been sent to Salem a little while before. Also a ketch with forty men was sent out of Salem as a man of war to recover the rest of the ketches. The Lord gave them success."⁵⁷

Actually the optimistic remarks made here are somewhat the results of wishful thinking, as we shall shortly see. These ketches carried crews of approximately five men each and beside the wounded there were killed Nathaniel Kun and Peter Petty and possibly others. Twenty-one men killed or wounded out of sixty odd gives one some idea of the savagery of the assaults. We further learn that all the prisoners were not released immediately.

On August eighteenth at Pemaquid, Chief Madockawando, who appears to have been the leader of the raids, delivered up four more of the prisoners. Obviously these people were completely at home on the water to take ships at Cape Sable and be at a peace conference at Pemaquid a few weeks later.

By the first of August Mather relates, "news came that several ketches were surprised as they lay secure in the harbors whither they used to turn in upon every occasion as they were making their fishing voyages. There were twenty of these fishing ketches thus surprised first and last which carried five or six men apiece."⁵⁸ Let us now see how these vessels were taken and what success the English had in retaking them.

A Surprise Attack and Wholesale Capture

At daybreak July eighth five vessels were lying peacefully at anchor in Port La Tour. Suddenly ten Indians appeared in canoes. As soon as they were within range, they opened fire with muskets on the Salem ketch, *William And Sarah*, Joseph Bovey master, and drove all hands aboard below decks. The vessel was then boarded and the demoralized crew bound.

The rest of the vessels were taken in a similar manner and the whole fleet got underway for the Penobscot.

However, they had not been at sea very long before a bark was sighted. The Indians crowded on sail, overtook and boarded her and then, because the captives outnumbered the captors, the various English crews were mixed up and the fleet kept on its course. Once again a sail was sighted and the *William And Sarah* appears to have broken off from the fleet and gone in chase. Once she was separated from the rest of the prizes the prisoners rose against their captors, overpowered them and proceeded to Salem.

The *William And Sarah* arrived in Salem on the fast day just mentioned and apparently was the cause of the remark, "the Lord was pleased to send in some of our ketches on the fast day." Once in port the women of Salem used the fast day to set a precedent for their neighbors in Marblehead to follow later when they dealt with that unfortunate soul, Captain Ireson. According to Mather, the women were so enraged that they seized the captive Indians and tore them to pieces.⁵⁹

Although as we have seen, vessels had been taken before this, this was the first wholesale capture in colonial history. Further, these vessels came from the heart of New England and the legislature could not ignore such depredations as they might have done had the ships belonged to the inhabitants of Maine. Therefore, when the town of Salem petitioned that a vessel be commissioned to go in search of the captured ketches the request was granted and the ketch *Supply* with a crew of fifty men was immediately dispatched to Cape Sable to retake the prizes and, at the same time, to warn two Salem ketches there that the Indians intended to surprise them.

The Search for the Indian Privateers

Unfortunately there was more of speed and less of thought in the manoeuvre. Apparently the assembly either didn't know or forgot to inform the *Supply* as to the exact descriptions of the vessels taken. Further, they failed to notify the rest of the fishing fleet that they had dispatched a privateer to their assistance. It, therefore, became necessary for the *Supply* to question every vessel she came up with concerning her identity.

Meanwhile bad news had traveled faster than good and the entire fishing fleet seems to have been cognizant of the fact that Indians were abroad on the sea. Accordingly every time the *Supply* attempted to approach a fishing vessel, the latter, fearing she was about to be captured, would crowd on sail for all she was worth. The privateer would then become suspicious and give chase. Thus much valuable time was consumed while friend fled and friend pursued. And, as if this weren't sufficiently annoying

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it was August, the month of fog in the Bay of Fundy and the *Supply* was constantly beset by this evil.

Despite these aggravations the *Supply* eventually reached Cape Sable but found no sign of the vessels. The master then decided to return and cruise the Maine coast. Somewhere near what is now Machias the privateer sighted a ketch manned by Indians coming down the river. They engaged immediately but the ketch was quickly embayed under some high cliffs. While some of the Indians manned the cliffs, the rest prepared to fight their prize. The battle lasted from August seventh through the eighth and the Indians proceeded to ply the privateer so hotly that she finally decided to break off the engagement and return to Salem. Accordingly the expedition returned to port with only one prize, a French shallop caught fishing in English waters. Apparently, it was to be the conference table and not force of English arms that was to decide the fate of the captured fishermen.

A Short-Lived Truce with the Eastern Tribes

About this time the Indians seem to have realized the value of ships as a ransom factor and at the same time gave up any idea, temporarily, of attacking the fishing islands. The vessels taken at Cape Sable and elsewhere from this time on were to play an important part at peace talks. A letter from A. Brockett in August of 1677 mentions that the Indians were willing to exchange prisoners but were, at first, reluctant to return prize vessels. However, they were finally persuaded to give them up.⁶⁰ Part of a letter from the general court in 1677 reads as follows, "We have concluded a peace with those easterne indians and have regained and sent to us most of our captives and a promise of returning seuerall vessels the Indians have surprised the daily performance whereof we daily expect."⁶¹ One cannot help but wonder whether the Indians were beginning to become aware of how to conduct themselves at a peace treaty or whether they had other, unknown plans for these captured vessels and really wanted to keep them.

After 1677 armed truce fell over the country for a few years before hostilities broke out all over again. This time the French were to enter the fray and the Indians were to ally themselves with them. Because of this alliance one encounters numerous difficulties. From the scanty references at hand it is hard to say just how much of the marine assaults can be laid at the door of the Indian, how much the French were responsible for them, and how much was done by their combined efforts. When a

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vessel was taken we are often in doubt as to whether she was a prey to the French or the Indians.

As a matter of fact the English probably did not themselves know who had taken the vessel. As a sop to their pride, whenever there was any doubt they preferred to attribute the loss to the French rather than the Indians. Further, since the French were frequently on the Indian raids it is often difficult to decide who masterminded the attacks. Wherever possible this paper has attempted to distinguish between French and Indian depredations and only those incidents that were committed by an Indian majority have been included.

III RESUMPTION OF THE UNDECLARED WAR

As has been said, an uneasy truce existed for a few years following 1677 while both sides gathered strength for a new assault. For three could never be peace between the English and the Indian until the former had been driven from the continent or the latter had been reduced to a menial and caitiff existence. No true peace could ever exist between two peoples whose philosophies and ideologies were so different until one had succumbed to the other. Therefore, we find nothing particularly startling in a little item appearing in Sewell's diary stating that a fast was held on August twenty-third, 1688, for the Indian raids that had been taking place.⁶² Although at that time there appear to have been no raids on shipping of any account, the next year was to be quite different.

Although at the time there was no avowed enemy on the coast an address was made in the Assembly on March ninth of the following year that said, "We may expect the enemy back upon our seacoast."⁶³ The truth of this statement was borne out very shortly. Early in the summer of 1689 came a petition from Arousick Island in the Kennebec. The garrison was in trouble. Indians had been seen and an amphibious assault upon the island was imminent. As a plea for assistance the report stated, among other things, the following reason for sending them aid, "It would be of great damage to the fishing fleet and other prospects . . . if the fort were taken."⁶⁴ Here for the first time we have two official statements that list naval depredations as being of consequence. Boston was aware of the peril of the fishing fleets.

Although the general assembly might have been willing to overlook this one letter, another one was mailed the same day from the "Sagadahock" garrison. Elisha Andrews, the commander of the fort, wrote that he was in dire trouble. The fishing fleets had all fled southward and, "the kosters noe longer come, as they used to." The letter further states that the entire province may shortly be wiped out and concludes, "Therefore would desire y'r honors to take it into your considerations whither to drawe me of or sende me speedie releefe. . . . I am out of provision . . ."⁶⁵

Up to this time the general court seems to have contented itself with campaigns upon land and punitive or rescue expeditions by sea. By the

same token, the colonists seem to have felt that the dangers lay on land and only mentioned the marine depredations as second thought. This then is different. Aid is begged to hold the enemy on land and sea. What is more, the government took cognizance of this fact. The brigantine *William and Mary* was commissioned to patrol the waters between Cape Cod and Piscataua.⁶⁶ Later two more vessels were pressed into service; the frigate *Nonsuch* and the sloop of war *Mary* were put on station at Pemaquid and specifically ordered to patrol against "French and Indians."⁶⁷ Privateers like Captain Alden were fitted out and ordered to take vessels belonging to the "French and Indians" and for the first time commissions began to read that captains should beware of being surprised or betrayed by the Indians.⁶⁸ Vessels no longer sailed to the eastward except under convoy with a large vessel to protect them against the French and shoal draft vessels to guard against the Indian menace and the country groaned under the expense of this naval necessity.⁶⁹

The Out-lying Settlements Petition for Protection

Soon the "fishing islands," heretofore considered fairly safe from Indian attack, despite the threats of Mugg, began sending in hasty petitions. The Isles of Shoals, in 1691, begged for a garrison of forty men to protect their settlement, which already boasted over a hundred people, and the court was pleased to grant the petition. The troops were sent specifically to guard against the "Indians and French."⁷⁰ By this time the Indian menace to these islands had become, apparently, a matter of primary importance in the defense of the province. Later, when it was suggested that the garrison be removed, Mr. Diamond wrote from there that the danger from the Indians was very great and the garrison was maintained.⁷¹ From these few remarks we note the changed tenor of the times. Let us examine the causes for this new interest in protecting the sea frontiers.

Within a month after the petition of the people of Arousick Island reached Boston, nine men took a vessel across the river from Sagadahoc to pick up some cattle grazing there. Before they were able to land, eight canoes appeared from around the bend and a pitched battle ensued while the whites tried desperately to get their vessel clear. Eventually the sloop managed to outsail the canoes and return to the garrison, but not before six of the nine men aboard had been killed.⁷²

On the tenth of August young John Giles was working in the field with his father when they were surprised by Indians. Young Giles was taken captive and his father was killed. The Indians then invested the fort which put up a strong resistance. The natives managed to capture Mr. Pater-

sall's sloop which lay, unmanned under the guns of the fort. The enemy then moved her out of harm's way and used her to "treat" for the fort. With the sloop gone the garrison's only hope of escape was denied them. The Indians offered the sloop back, and safe conduct to the defenders if they would surrender the place, which was agreed upon and the English were allowed to sail away and the fort demolished.⁷³

With things in this condition it is little wonder that the assembly sent a second letter, on August the twenty-seventh, to Captain Alden once again warning him to take special precautions that the privateer *Mary* be not taken by surprise, the principal weapon employed by the natives at this time.⁷⁴

All in all the summer of 1689 was a poor one for the coastwise and fishing trades. In September, despite all the government could do, a great quantity of vessels had been lost. In a masterful piece of understatement the town of Salem wrote, in September of that year, to the governor and informed him that "several" fishing vessels had not returned. Of this number, six were in the hands of the French at Port Royal. What happened to the rest? Some of them undoubtedly were Indian prizes.⁷⁵

Capt. Southack's Cruise to Nova Scotia

The following year the interest of the people was directed toward Nova Scotia where an attack was to be made on the French. For this purpose a considerable fleet was gathered and set sail. In the flotilla was one Captain Cyprian Southack, commander of a twenty-gun vessel with a crew of one hundred and nineteen men. Accompanying him was a large ketch whose armor and crew is not disclosed. After reaching Nova Scotia, Southack found little for his vessel and her consort to do, so he determined to double Cape Sable and raid the southeast coast of Nova Scotia.

The weather appeared auspicious and the worthy captain reached the cape about the eighteenth of June without incident and anchored in a small harbor, intending to proceed further to the northeast the next day. However that was as far as the captain ever went. The next day dawned bright and clear and as the vessels prepared to get under way they were attacked by forty Indians in canoes. During the contest the English had four men wounded and managed to kill two of their assailants. When the attack was over, Southack altered his plans and returned to Boston saying that the season was too far advanced to proceed further.⁷⁶

What made the expedition turn back? The season was actually the most propitious for a cruise toward Halifax. The fog would not have thickened until August, gales would not be expected until September and the weather

in June would be ideally mild. Something else must have changed the captain's mind. The only thing that we know anything about that might have deterred him was the assault by the Indians. Yet this attack as given here does not appear to be alarming to any but a timid soul, and Southack was anything but timid.⁷⁷ There are many aspects of this account that are incongruous.

If the natives were in canoes, why weren't they dispersed by the cannon? His crew, heavily armed as they were, should have been able to frustrate with ease many times the number of Indians listed. Yet four of his men were wounded and only two Indians were killed. It seems obvious that, for reasons best known to himself, the captain chose to surpress the true nature of an assault that in actuality must have been considerably more severe.

This idea is given substantial support when we learn that during the same year the Micmacs had taken an unspecified number of fishing vessels on the Nova Scotia coast. The inroads were severe enough to make Governor Bradford order a fleet sent out to recapture them. It might be added that the success of this expedition seems to have been meagre.⁷⁸

The Fall of the Fort at Casco and Attack at Wells

Although, in that year of 1689, Southack's expedition to Nova Scotia is the event that is of greatest interest to us, there was another event of marine importance that took place in Casco Bay that same year. On April thirteenth news was brought to Boston that thirty canoes were out in Casco Bay.⁷⁹ Actually this appears to have been an early invasion of the coast, for almost all of the accounts both before and after this time occurred during the mid-summer months. However, the purpose of these canoes was soon learned. In May Sewall received a letter from the Eastward informing him of the fall of the Casco fort. This disaster was almost complete for only one shallop was able to get clear, and that was in a running battle, which was broken off only when the shallop managed to outsail her pursuers.⁸⁰ (During July this same force destroyed the settlement at Oyster River.)

In 1691 the naval assaults were stepped up. In August of that year two sloops were proceeding to the eastward. On August seventh they were run up the Penobscot, allowed to ground out. The crew repaired ashore where they were assaulted by a party of Indians and driven back aboard. For the rest of the night, until the tide rose and the sloops were got off, the battle raged furiously. However, the crews managed to keep control.⁸¹

That same summer, off the Isles of Shoals, near Boone Island a sloop and a ketch took a shallop with a "great gun." She also chased several

other sail without success and the fishermen did not know whether she was Indian or French but they conceded that "she sailed uncommon well."⁸²

Later that same year, near Wells, was enacted the most ingenious and intense attack waged against vessels up to that time. A large party of French and Indians were engaged in assaulting Wells when they discovered two sloops, that had just come in with supplies, anchored in an estuary near the fort with fifteen men aboard under the command of Lieutenant Stover. Several hundred Indians attacked the vessels as they lay at anchor, but since they lacked sufficient canoes they were unable to board them. (In this battle the main aim seems to have been to destroy rather than capture the sloops in question.)

One party of the enemy ensconced themselves on a promontory, immediately to seaward of the two sloops, that commanded the exit to the ocean. Although out of range of the vessels as they lay at anchor this party provided an effectual stopper in the bottle, for the sloops could not run by them to safety.

Meanwhile the rest of the attackers deployed themselves behind some lumber, a haystack, and opened fire from the estuary bank. Fortunately for the English, the Indians did not have heavy artillery and the sloop's planking seems to have been heavy enough to stop the musket shot. All the English had to do was keep below the bulwarks and they were comparatively safe, for the Indians were unable to command any heights that would allow them to fire down upon the exposed deck.

After a few hours wherein the enemy spent considerable powder and ball to no avail the natives resorted to more effectual measures. They began firing blazing arrows into the vessels and this technique had a somewhat better result. Time and again the ships were set afire but each time the crews managed to extinguish the flames. Actually, it would be no easy matter to set a ship afire with arrows. Although the sails might burn, the planking would be slow to ignite and a few buckets of water sloshed on deck would almost preclude a vessel being fired by arrows. One might say that trying to fire a vessel in this manner would be like trying to light a log with a match.

While the arrows were falling on deck the tide was ebbing and the danger increased, for the sloops took the ground. Any attempt to make a mass attack across the slippery mud flats would have exposed the natives to a murderous fire from Stover's fifteen men and obviously would have been impractical. However, the Indians found a pair of cart wheels on which they built a platform and a bullet shield, to protect themselves.

The whole they piled with hay and set it ablaze. Despite all that Stover

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Model of the Sparrow Hawk, a typical seventeenth-century ketch.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

and his men could do they pushed the flaming barricade closer and closer to the grounded ships. Finally, when only a few feet intervened between the nearest vessel and the barricade and destruction seemed inevitable, the machine suddenly mired in the mud and could not be moved any further.

Although a failure, the barricade gave the assault forces a new idea. By the time the tide had flooded and begun to ebb again some sort of fire ship had been rigged and set adrift, blazing from stem to stern. The Indians had calculated aright and the ebb tide carried the fire ship down on the helpless sloops while the barrage was kept up ashore. However, fate once more intervened. Just as the fire ship was about to foul the sloops, the wind veered and blew it off and it drifted ashore. The wind then veered again and the fire ship capsized and sank. After more than forty-eight hours the assaulting party finally withdrew, leaving the English still in possession of their vessels.⁸³

Of course one could argue that this was not a true Indian attack. There were French with the Indians and it was they who generated the battle. There might be good logic in such reasonings, yet the methods employed by the besiegers in this battle had been used by the Indians ashore. Houses had been burned time and again by running a wagon load of hay against them without the benefit of French generalship. It would have been perfectly possible for the Indians to have thought up the wheeled barricade on their own. Once that failed it would hardly have taken a genius to think up the idea of a fire ship, although the Indians may well have found that they had to depend upon the French to construct it. Further, from this attack we learn just how hard it was for the Indians to take an English vessel with no heavy artillery.

French and Indian Raids Now Increase

From this time on the war appears to have been stepped up both ashore and afloat. The French and Indians raided town after town and the fisheries and coastwise trade became subject to heavier and heavier losses. Before long it was not even safe to fish in Massachusetts Bay. Vessels moved only in convoy and then only when needed. To lay this change in the times to the door of the Indians would neither be fair or accurate. Most of the damage was wrought by the French—especially offshore, and among the larger ships—but it would also be the height of folly not to attribute a large share of the onshore losses suffered by fishermen and coasters to Indian ingenuity. In fact Salem

fitted out a "scout shallop" to protect her vessels specifically from Indian attack.⁸⁴ Under the combined efforts of the French and Indians the English cause languished until 1696 when they finally began to stem the tide afloat and ashore.

In July of that year an English frigate, the *Nonsuch*, lost her fore-topmast in an engagement with the French and was forced to strike her colors. Since she was one of the few large English vessels in New England waters, her loss was a severe blow to the English cause. With such a vessel on patrol the Indians and French had been somewhat reluctant to cross Fundy in small vessels, and had chosen the longer route around the head of the Bay. With the frigate out of the way, new tactics were called for.

Hard on the heels of the news of the defeat of the frigate came news that eighteen canoes loaded with Indians had shoved off from Cape Sable that very month and were heading for an amphibious landing against Pemaquid.⁸⁵ In August Boston was informed that the French and Indians had landed from ships, six hundred strong.⁸⁶ These two statements conflict enough to make us wonder. What was meant by canoes in the July message; what was the proportion of French to Indians; where had the Indian canoes been for a month?

In most of the assaulting forces up to this time the majority of the troops had been composed of Indians with a sprinkling of Frenchmen. Assuming this to be true we may conclude that at least three hundred of the attacking forces were Indians. That would mean that the eighteen canoes that left Cape Sable carried about eighteen Indians apiece—plus their food and gear which would make them extremely large—at least big enough to carry two tons apiece. Further, these canoes should have been at Pemaquid within a week, at the outside, after they left Cape Sable unless they went round by the head of the Bay. One wonders how they employed the intervening time, and one further wonders how they kept themselves supplied with food and water for all that time.

There are several alternative answers. The canoes mentioned could have been lost or turned back and not been in any way involved in the Pemaquid landing. They could have gone around by the head of the bay, or the term "canoe" could have been misapplied. This last hypothesis is the most plausible. We know that the fishing fleets had suffered heavily at the hands of the Micmacs in Nova Scotia. It is possible that the eighteen canoes were in all actuality fishing vessels taken from the English previously. These vessels may have set out early and improved the intervening time by raiding the fisheries.

The Role Played by the Indian Mariners

About this time there appears to be a reluctance to attribute maritime losses to Indians. Apparently the English felt that sailing was a European skill and that it was degrading to have Englishmen taken by "tawnies" who should not be proficient in the art of ship handling. In support of this theory are two accounts, one in 1694, the other in 1695. On June twelfth 1694 word came that a French privateer had taken a fishing vessel to the St. John's River and that a ketch and a frigate had been sent after her. On September twenty-fifth, 1695, a French privateer took Major Brown's ketch and others, from the Isles of Shoals and retired to Casco Bay.⁸⁷

To a privateer a vessel meant prize money. If the French had captured these vessels why did they take them to the St. John's River and Casco Bay, both Indian strongholds? They could hardly expect prize money from them there, and the journey to Nova Scotia and the prize court would have been but little further. One can not help wondering if these were French prizes or prizes of Indian crews who took the vessels to their own country for their own use.

The idea just expressed lends the idea that the Micmacs crossed the bay in fishing vessels and not canoes. The idea is given further support by the address to the King from Boston that same year (1696). After listing the losses ashore and the defeat of the English frigate, it states that the fisheries were very badly damaged by the Indians and the French and concludes with the statement that "the English cause languishes very greatly."⁸⁸ When one realizes that the colonists would try to put the best face possible on conditions in New England, the plight of the fishing fleet becomes shockingly clear. Three hundred Indians loose on the coast in canoes or vessels for a month could well have "badly damaged" the fisheries.

If further proof be needed to substantiate the grim picture already painted, a letter from John Higginson of Salem should suffice. In the year 1697 he writes his brother that he has lost so many ships that he is ruined and adds concerning the rest of the town "of sixty-odd fishing ketches of this town but six are left." It is to be noted that smaller vessels are not listed nor are losses from other towns. If Salem be considered as a slightly-above-average-town the loss must have indeed been severe. A very considerable amount of this loss must be laid to the door of the Indians.⁸⁹

After 1696 another uneasy truce was concluded between the "Eastern Indians," as they were then generally known, and the colonists which continued until after the turn of the century. During that time there

seems to have been little or no marine depredations committed by them. When the raids began again they were complicated, as far as we are concerned here, by two things: the French were increasingly active with the Indians, which makes it difficult at this late date to tell when the natives were acting independently and when they were acting as minions under French command; the English became increasingly reluctant to report, except indirectly, any accounts of vessels taken or any marine attacks on British shipping along the coast. We are forced to learn of these attacks more and more from second hand sources such as depositions to the courts, made months later, for compensation for shipping losses at the hands of the Indians.

These depositions fail to do little more than state that a vessel was taken and not returned. We do not learn how she was taken and only rarely where or when. Typical of these reports from which we are forced to glean our knowledge of the extent, if not the manner, of these attacks is John Marsh's petition to the governor in 1703 for losses sustained by him the previous year. He writes, ". . . 10 best calfs ever I saw and one large Booll 3s, 6 akers of As goode Pease as ever I saw 24s, 2½ Akers of as Choyse Measling as A man would desire 7s, to my sloop 120£. . . ." ⁹⁰ Obviously his sloop had been captured and, if she were worth one half the amount her owner said she was, she would have been a sizeable craft. Unfortunately we do not know what became of her, nor do we know to what use she was put although since Marsh was paid fifty pounds we assume she was not returned.

As stated earlier there seems to have been a reluctance on the part of the English to attribute marine disasters to Indians. However reluctant they may have been to make much of these attacks, they were by no means unaware of them. The remarks concerning shipping that had been taken during the century, although secondhand, became increasingly numerous and the gubernatorial decrees against Indian piracy and the pleas from the eastward and from the "fishing islands" came with increasing regularity.

Actually the Indian cause was seriously in doubt after the destruction of the Pequots; with the demise of Philip it was in greater doubt than ever. By the turn of the century it was all but lost; when Father Ralle was killed the entire struggle was hopeless. However, the natives did not realize this and during the first quarter of the eighteenth century, while their homes and lands were being laid waste ashore, they made their most devastating attacks upon the fisheries and upon the coasting trade.

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Recognition of the Indian as a Sea-fighter

By 1700 the "Eastern Indians" were recognized by the English as seafarers as far as trade purposes were concerned, although they were reluctant to admit that he had any capabilities as a sea-fighter. In order to keep any semblance of amity between the Indians and the English it was necessary that the English trade to them be equal to what the French were willing to give.

In 1701 there appears to have been a lively trade in arms, ammunition, and naval stores going on between the Indians and the English under the auspices of Governor Dudley and his son.⁹¹ This trade may have been sponsored by the Governor in an attempt to keep the peace and gain allies against the French. However, there seems little excuse for continuing to run these things to the natives after they were at war with the English. However, it probably proved a very lucrative business and greater men than colonial governors have been diverted from the "strait and narrow" path by profit.

At any rate this trade became so odious that Dudley's enemies picked it up as a weapon to use against him. In 1707 there appeared an anonymous pamphlet in London entitled *A Memorial of the Present Deploable State of New England*, wherein the author states that Dudley ran powder, shot, rigging and naval stores to the Indians through Captains Lawton and Vetch and as a result the natives were induced to go privateering which "raised great havoc with the fisheries."

At any rate the Indians seem to have been supplied with powder and lead and the colonists were disturbed about it. In 1701 they asked that the fort at Pemaquid, long an issue both of the sword and the orator's eloquence, be reinforced against coming attacks. The chief reason for this measure was that it was the major protection for the fishing fleet that went to the eastward, from the French as well as the Indians.⁹²

In 1702 a number of ketches from Salem were fishing off Nova Scotia. They were caught in a storm and driven into Port La Tour where they attempted to ride it out. Twenty Indians suddenly appeared in canoes and fell upon the anchored vessels and took three of them. One of the vessels appears to have belonged to Col. Higginson, a prominent citizen of Salem but who owned the others we do not know. In the fray Captain Hilliard was killed as was one David Masters. The rest of the fleet revised their opinion of the weather, slipped their cables and put to sea. News of the disaster was brought to Boston on May 28.⁹³

All in all 1702 was not a disastrous year for the colonial marine arm. 1703 was no worse although it got off to an early start. On the nineteenth of January Gallop, in charge of the fort in Casco Bay, sent out an armed party in a sloop with Bennet as master. The sloop was attacked by Indians in canoes and a running battle ensued wherein four of Bennet's men were killed, and several wounded before he was able to get clear without, apparently, doing any noticeable damage to his adversaries.⁹⁴

The Amphibious Attack on Casco Fort

On August tenth of that year the Indians launched the greatest amphibious attack against this same fort that they had yet attempted. They landed in an undetermined number of canoes and invested the fort. For six days they tried to take the place with every method they could think of, including sapping. Only the timely arrival of Southack in the *Province Galley* saved the fort. Southack captured and destroyed two hundred canoes and recaptured a large unknown ship that the Indians had themselves captured earlier that same year with a large amount of plunder aboard. According to a letter from Colonel Dudley, the only thing that prevented all of Casco Bay from falling into the hands of the natives was the presence of the galley in the area.⁹⁵

The effects of these engagements were widely felt. Once again the coasters stopped running. This means that the eastern provinces were short of food and stores. To ensure that supplies were forthcoming, Governor Dudley was forced "to beat" for one hundred and fifty volunteers to man the coasters that normally plied the area.⁹⁶

After one assault in September of 1704 on a fisherman⁹⁷ mention of attacks on vessels vanishes from the pages of the extant literature of the time for several years. 1705, 1706 and 1707 appear to have been relatively peaceful years, in which trade pursued its normal course, with about the only news "from the eastward" concerning itself with the mast fleet, occasional visits to Piscatua by the Governor, and lists of vessels clearing from the above port to various parts, principally the West Indies and Boston.

In 1707 the first warning of things to come is heralded by the news that Rhode Island privateers are out after a French privateer reported off Martha's Vineyard. Although the vessel was a Frenchman, it presaged aboriginal assaults, since whenever the French were out, their allies were not far behind! So it is that in May of 1708 we are not surprised to learn that an amphibious attack in Maine resulted in the capture of Lieutenant Littlefield who was held prisoner.⁹⁸

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In August of this year William Pickering of Salem was commissioned by His Excellency the Governor to protect the fishing fleet on Cape Sable,⁹⁹ but we are not informed of any further activity in this regard. Again in November of that year Sewall recounts that a sloop from Port Royal took a ship at Cape Harbor, but whether French or Indian we are not told.

The Indians Continue as Marine Marauders

Although the English give meager references to sea depredations of that year we learn from French sources that there was at least one lively skirmish in Nova Scotian waters. That summer there was a fleet of thirty sail of fishermen offshore. During the night Micmac canoes slipped off the beach and, before the English were aware of what was going on, boarded two fishermen. A battle ensued in which several Englishmen were killed and the vessels taken. The Micmacs then joined forces in one vessel and, using her as a privateer, attacked and captured two more vessels before the rest of the fleet was able to get clear.¹⁰⁰ From the above facts it may be surmised that the raiders were few, else they would have used both vessels instead of one.

After this brief flare-up the record remains, for two whole years, totally void of any sea disturbance whatever except for notices of "Pyrats" being on the coast, but these were white men and not Indians. It is not until June 23, 1711, that we again see the marine marauders at work and then the *Boston News Letter* informs us that the "Panablacot" Indians attacked a large party of loggers near Port Royal while they were ashore from "whaleboats and flatboats." Twenty-six of the party were killed and thirty-four were taken prisoner. What became of the flatboats and whaleboats is not divulged.¹⁰¹

Again in August of that year came news that a French privateer had taken "several fishing vessels." Others were surprised and taken in "some harbours" by French and Indian privateers.¹⁰² Whether or not this refers to Indian privateers and to French privateers, or vessels manned by both, we are not informed. (As a matter of fact, details concerning these raids from the earliest times have been meager but the period from 1701 until about 1717 is even less informative than the rest.)

On the thirteenth of June the following year news was brought from Piscataqua that a fishing boat there had reported seeing a small vessel "on the wreck at Cape Elizabeth Point taken by the Indians."¹⁰³ Was she wrecked and captured or captured and then lost? We do not know, but it seems probable that the latter was the case.

There would be little that the natives could do with a wreck in the way of getting her off the beach and repairing her, and it would be equally unlikely that they would be long plundering her if they found her ashore. Certainly the implication of the word "taken" would hardly be justified in referring to a salvage party.

A month later the *News Letter*, again with no accompanying information, informs us that a French privateer was captured among the crew of which were thirteen Cape Sable Indians. If we assume that half the crew was composed of the Indians mentioned she would have been a fairly large vessel for those days.

Despite the fact that there were only two brief notices in the *News Letter* concerning our subject in 1711 there appears to have been considerably more activity than appears on the surface. Sewall informs us on June thirtieth of that year that one Captain Carver was taken by two privateers,¹⁰⁴ but he fails to mention where or by whom. Again, on August twenty-fourth, he mentions a debate, "Debate about *Province Galley* being used to the Eastward against coastwise Indians. Hot debate and not done."¹⁰⁵ From this it may be inferred that there was considerable danger, if not actual attacks, to be anticipated. One may further infer that the governor was opposed to this plan in the light of later events.


If the *News Letter* is silent on this subject for these three years there is to be found some indications that all was not wholly peaceful afloat. On May 4, 1713 Mather asked that the congregation pray "for the poor fishermen at Marblehead" and on November fourth of that year he addressed a sermon entitled "Deliverances at Sea."¹⁰⁶ "Poor fishermen" and "Deliverances" do not mean Indian attacks in themselves but there had been no tempests noted for the time and the only other thing likely to have given cause for a sermon on Deliverances would then be marine assaults.

In 1715 the *Boston News Letter*, after its prolonged silence, has three items that mention raids on shipping off the coast of Nova Scotia. On July 20, 1715 the governor ordered Captain Caley to Nova Scotia. Some "drunken Indians had taken four or five fishing vessels in harbours to the eastwards of Nova Scotia." The ship *Rose* had already gone in pursuit.¹⁰⁷

On July twenty-ninth we learn from Captain Odiorn, a released captive from the vessels taken at Mullegash Harbour, that forty-seven Indians were involved in the battle but that a native named Captain Walker, sent out by the governor, made the captors return everything to the prisoners.¹⁰⁸ Finally, on the first week in August we hear that three more vessels were released.¹⁰⁹

From the above statements we are led to believe that the capture of

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Andr. Chyd delin et sculp.

Penobscot "wherry." Heavy dugout canoe.

these vessels was the result of an overdose of alcohol and that when the natives sobered up all was well. This was in no wise the case.

Southack Is Again Dispatched to the Eastward

On the twentieth of July letters were read before the House of Representatives that the Cape Sable Indians had taken "several" fishing vessels, and Captain Southack and the man-o-war *Rose* were immediately dispatched to treat for their return.¹¹⁰

On the twenty-fifth of July we learn that two sloops and a shallop belonging to William Pepperell and two sloops belonging to Jonathan Odiorn were the ones captured. Eleven hands of the crew were still captives and the natives refused to treat for the vessels.¹¹¹ Since five days would hardly allow enough time for a vessel to go direct from Boston to Cape Sable and back under the most favorable circumstances, we must deduce that other vessels had either gone out earlier with powers to treat with the natives or were already there with such powers before the little fleet departed on the twenty-fifth. Such vessels would, in all probability, have been privateers. When the court heard this news they were sufficiently aroused to send a frigate after Southack and the *Rose*, with the express orders to protect the fishing fleet because "the Cape Sable Indians put the fishery in a great jeopardy."¹¹²

Nor was this the end of the matter. On July twenty-sixth Joseph Dudley ordered a frigate and two heavily armed sloops to go to Cape Sable with orders to send the fishing fleet home.¹¹³ Since there is no indication that any of the above-mentioned vessels had returned to Boston, it must be concluded that there was a substantial English fleet cruising off the southern tip of Nova Scotia—any privateers that may have been there earlier; the *Mary Galley*, the *Rose*, two frigates and two armed sloops.

Yet with all this weight of ordnance, the House of Representatives did not feel that the fishermen could safely remain in Nova Scotian waters but must return. The strength of the marine arm of the Micmacs must have been considered formidable indeed. We may feel certain that no such expedition would have been sent out against Indian canoes, if for no other reason than that a frigate would have been of little use against shoal draft canoes. It was the fear that the captured vessels had been or were being made into privateers that prompted such action.

Apparently the emissaries met with success for on August first the crews and vessels were ransomed and the latter returned to their owners. With this final incident tranquillity appears to have reigned between the whites and Indians until 1718, and the only hazard, beyond natural ones, to the

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fleet was in the form of ever-increasing raids from pirates. Only two factors marred the peaceful scene. One was the passage of a bill against unrestricted trade with the Indians; the other an awareness of inevitable resumption of fighting at sea. In May of 1716 the people in Maine were apprehensive that war would shortly break out with the natives. To be sure Father Ralle's Indians were up in 1718 and battles took place ashore, but there is no evidence that would indicate any disturbances at sea.

The next indication of maritime trouble to appear in the records is found late in 1721 when the House of Representatives ordered one hundred men to patrol, both by land and sea, against attacks by the Indians, but if any occurred we are not informed of them.¹¹⁴ However, the proposal seems to have been timely for war was to break out in 1722 on a scale as yet unequalled.

IV THE COMBATANTS LAY A COURSE TOWARD A CLIMAX

The war began early in 1722. The very fact that it was early indicated that it would be violent, for in the past the earlier the attacks the more savage they became as the summer progressed. In this case the first assault was a minor one but its occurrence in April made it ominous. On the fourth of that month the governor ordered out a "well-armed" vessel to protect the frontiers after learning that hostiles had killed a man on Richmond Island.¹¹⁵

May appears to have been peaceful enough but in June the war really began in earnest. During the first two weeks amphibious attacks were made by sixty Indians in twenty canoes upon the English around "Merrymeeting" while another group captured, burned and sank a large sloop at St. George.¹¹⁶ We are also informed that two Ipswich fishermen were attacked on June thirteenth but beat off their assailants and escaped.¹¹⁷

The First Broadside—"A Brief Narrative . . ."

In conjunction, or at least at approximately the same time, with these attacks, a schooner under the command of a Lieutenant Tilton lay at anchor in Fox Bay (probably Fox Island Thorofare, Vinal Haven Island). This incident is preserved for us in a rather remarkable broadside ballad which has been reproduced here for several reasons. In the first place it paints a clear picture of the incident in question, at the same time giving us an insight into the contemporary feelings of the whites for the natives in 1722. Further, it helps to explain, through its complete lack of understanding, why the fighting was so bitter and so prolonged, and is one of the very few "Indian ballads" extant in this country.

It is the earliest ballad, and one of the two ballads dealing exclusively with New England Indians, the other being a broadside on the Pigwacket fight (For details see, *Bulletin of the Folksong Society of the Northeast*, Cambridge, Mass., 1930-1937, *Bulletin* No. 4, pp. 3-5. under title "Lovewells War"). Further, it is the earliest of the only two broadsides concerning Indians engaged in sea fights and is the only one concerned with New England. Any one of these reasons would suffice to include the poem. The combination makes it mandatory.

A Brief Narrative, or Poem

Down at an Eastward harbor called Fox Bay,
They in a schooner at an anchor lay,
It was upon the fourteenth day of June,
Six stout great Indians in the afternoon
In two canoes on board said schooner came
With painted faces in a churlish frame;
One of them called Penobscot governor
The other Captain Sam a surly cur,
The other four great Indians strong and stout,
Which for their ill design they had picked out
Said governor and Sam with one more went
Down the forecastle bold and insolent;
Unto Lieutenant Tilton they applied,
Themselves, and down they sat one at each side;
The other placed himself behind his back,
Waiting the others motion when to act.

INDIAN

What's matter Governor my men detain
And no send hostage home to me again?
What's matter he no good, but all one devil?
What! no love Indian! Governor no civil.
Penobscot Indian Governor great man,
All one Governor Shute says captain Sam.

TILTON

Great While since we from Boston hither came,
We poor fishermen are not to blame.

INDIAN

Your Boston Governor no good me see;
Our Governor much better man than he.
These cannibals thus in their Indian pride,
The best of Governor's scorn and deride.
But they at lenth to hasten their design
From underneath their blankets pulled a line,
With which his arms they would have compassed round
But he so strong and nimble was not bound,
'Till he got out the cuddy door at last,
Before they had attained to bind him fast.
These cannibals being strong and bold,

THE AMERICAN INDIAN

BOTH

And upon him kept fast their Indian hold :
They got him down with their much struggling
And bound his arms behind him with their string,
The other three which kept above the deck,
Also had their design brought to effect.
Looking about him, presently he found
They had his brother Daniel also bound ;
For they with him had acted even so,
One at each side and one behind did go,
And down they sat, he not aware of harm
The rogue behind fastened on each arm,
And twitched them back ; the other two with line
Him pinioned : so thus they were confin'd.
They tied said Daniel's legs he could not stand,
Nor help himself neither with foot nor hand,
They struck them many blows on face and head ;
And their long Indian knives they flourished :
Triumphing over them, and saying, Why
You so stout man that you no quarter cry ?

TILTON

What Indian mean to act so in this thing,
Now peace between the English and French king ?

INDIAN

Hah ! no me war your Governor no good,
He no love Indians me understood.

TILTON

What ails you now, you sturdy Captain Sam,
Do Indian now intend to kill and cram ?

INDIAN

We Governor Shute's men kill and take,
Penobscot (All one) Boston Prison make.
You English men our Indian land enjoy,
They no surrender then we them destroy.
Indian bimeby take Captain Westbrook's fort,
Some kill, some captive take ; that matchet sport.
On board them a young lad and not confined
They made him hoist the ancient to their mind !
Then Admiral of this same harbor rid,
In mighty triumph none could them forbid.

So two of these black rogues in their canoes
 On shore they go to carry back the news :
 So was but four of them on board remained,
 Of whom this favor Daniel then obtain'd,
 For to unty his legs and ease his hand,
 That he might have them something at command.
 After which thing he presently contrives
 What method then to take to save their lives
 While they were plundering so busily,
 He saw a splitting knife that was nearby,
 To which he goes and turns his back about,
 Eying them well, lest they should him find out ;
 And so he works said knife into his hand,
 With which he cuts his line but still does stand.
 Although two of said Indians him eye'd,
 They did not know but he remained fast tied.
 Two of said Indians were plundering,
 Down the forecastle while he did this thing,
 The other two so watchful and so shy,
 And on him kept a constant Indian eye,
 That he stands still, waiting till he could find,
 When they did him not so much mind ;
 But when to plunder they to searching goes
 Then his contrivance presently he shows
 He to his brother Jacob runs with speed,
 And cuts his line : now both of them are freed.
 The Indians now alarmed hereby,
 In Indian language made a hideous cry :
 Crying Chau hau, chau hau ; for they espy'd
 That both these English men were got unty'd ;
 Like roaring lyons with an axe and knives,
 Made violent assaults to take their lives ;
 But God who had determined to save,
 Undaunted courage unto them he gave ;
 That they with such a manly confidence,
 Although unarmed, stood in their own defence ;
 And tho' they had from these bloodthirsty hounds
 Received many dismal stabs and wounds,
 While in their skirmish blood was up and hot,
 No more than flea bites them they minded not.

Said Daniel still retained his splitting knife,
 Who nimbly plied the same and fit for life,
 With one hand fended off the Indian blows,
 And with the other cross the face and nose
 Of Captain Sam, until his pagan head
 Was chop'd and gash'd, and so much mangled;
 Bits of Indian scalp hung down in strings
 And blood run pouring thence as out of springs.
 Jacob said Governor so managed,
 He was so mauled and beat, that he so bled,
 His Indian head and face with blood was dy'd,
 (See what comes of his swelling Indian pride.)
 Of him he catch'd fast hold, and up him brings,
 Unto the side and overboard him flings.
 Then Daniel presently took Captain Sam,
 And brought his hand about his Indian ham,
 And to the vessel's side he nimbly goes,
 And his black carcass in the water throws.
 Now by this time behold Jacob his brother,
 Of these black rogues had catch'd up another,
 And overboard his Indian carcass sent
 To scramble in the water as he went,
 And then said Daniel run the fourth to catch,
 At which the rogue a nimble jump,
 And overboard he goes and swims to shore;
 This only rogue escaped out of four.
 One of the other three, him swimm'd part way,
 At length sinks down and there was forc'd to stay.
 Two of the other rogues with much ado
 Got out of water into a canoe,
 Which to the vessel's side was fasten'd,
 Themselves in it awhile they shelter'd,
 Said Indians on board had left a gun,
 Unto the same Jacob Tilton run,
 Catching it up to shoot them, it mist fire,
 Which dissappointed him of his desire.
 He catching up a stout great setting pole,
 With all his might he struck them on the jole,
 Giving them many blows upon the head;
 Over they turns and sunk like any lead.

THE COMBATANTS LAY A COURSE TOWARD A CLIMAX

We think our country now at peace might rest,
If all our Indian foes were thus suppresst.
Let God the glory of such conquest have,
Who can by few as well as many save.
They having thus dispatch'd this Indian crew
They presently consulted what to do :
Three more canoes laden to the brim
With Indians as deep as they could swim,
Come paddling down with all their might and mein
Hoping the valient Tiltens to retain.
Daniel, which was both nimble, stout and spry
He fetch'd an ax and running presently
He cuts the cable, then they hoist their sail,
Leaving their neighbors that they might bewail
Over their Governor who in dispute
Had termed himself as great and good as Shute.
Before that they had sail'd many miles,
Their wounds began to be as sore as boils,
From whence the blood ran streaming through their cloaths,
Quite from their shoulders down unto their toes.
There they sat down in woeful misery,
Expecting every moment when to die ;
Not having anything to cheer their heart,
Nor dress their wounds to ease them of their smart,
And verily we think had perished,
Had not the lad (which has been mentioned)
Been very helpful in this sore distress.
What reason then have they of thankfulness
That God has spared him from this Indian Crew
For to help them when they could nothing do.
After they had from foes escaped thus,
They sail'd and came into Matinnicus.
Nigh twenty-four hours if not more,
They were acoming from the former shore :
Here they among the English find relief
Who dress their wounds which ease them of their grief.
Where in few days their vessel did arrive :
Through so much danger misery and pain
They are so return'd to friends again.
Thus I have summ'd up this tragic scene,

THE AMERICAN INDIAN



A late nineteenth-century photograph showing a Penobscot camp and canoes at Bar Harbor, Maine. Note how little the designs have changed and the number of canoes at so late a date.

Courtesy of Peabody Museum, Salem, Mass.

THE COMBATANTS LAY A COURSE TOWARD A CLIMAX

As from their mouths it told to me has been ;
No alterations, but in some expressions
Used other words ; then pardon such digressions,
Since I used only for sake of verse,
Which might not less nor more than truth rehearse,
Your candid servant in this poetrie,¹¹⁸
Described in letters two W.G.

Captain Blin Escapes and Goes to the Rescue

Following the attack on Tilton is a minor incident. On June twenty-second the House of Representatives learned that six natives attacked two men in a small fishing boat "from Ipswich." The attack was repulsed with losses to the natives but, because of it, great anxiety was felt for the safety of the "fishing isles." On June twenty-eighth, ten whaleboats were ordered out to patrol the coast as a result of this and one other attack, and a vessel was dispatched to Passamaquoddy to try to rescue one Captain Blin who had been captured as well as to advise all vessels of their peril.¹¹⁹

Exactly why the vessel went to Passamaquoddy is not clear, for Blin and one John Adams Jr., appear to have been captured, along with two other shallops, off Nova Scotia. Blin and Adams, however, managed to regain a shallop and escape in her. Unfortunately, the full details of this affair were recorded in number 963 of the *Boston News Letter*, which is no longer extant.

As soon as he returned, Blin fitted out another boat and set out to ransom his vessel and crew. Off Cape Sable he lured three natives aboard and made them prisoner, intending to use them to fortify his offers for ransom. Meanwhile, one Captain Robinson, hearing of Blin's misfortune had sailed to Canso determined to rescue the crews. There he met two canoes containing seven Indians of whose number he managed to kill six. This so aroused their friends on shore that they determined to kill thirty-odd English prisoners. (This is the first indication that there were more than four vessels involved.) At this point Blin arrived on the scene and attempted to ransom the whites and vessels but the natives refused until the skipper threatened to hang his prisoners instantly from the yardarm if they refused to agree. This act on Blin's part somewhat dismayed the natives and they came to terms. As a result, five vessels and twenty-one prisoners were redeemed and Blin returned to Boston.¹²⁰

On August the seventeenth Captain Elliot's sloop, under command of Captain Broadstreet, set sail to the "westward of where Captain Elliot had the dispute with the Indians" and repossessed three sail but saw no

natives or captives and returned to Canso. On the way they hailed Captain Robinson who had at that time captured one vessel but seen no Indians. Robinson returned on the thirteenth with one canoe, two vessels, two scalps and a tale.

Near Marlygash, Robinson fell in with a boat containing one Frenchman and one English prisoner. They informed him that nearby were five vessels held by sixty Indians. Robinson immediately prepared to make an attack after dark, but before he could put his plan into action he was discovered. Finding that his presence was known Robinson played the role of "poor fisherman," and eventually succeeded in luring two "double armed" canoes containing six men close aboard. One Indian came aboard, to whom they offered quarter. But that worthy replied by snapping his gun at Lieutenant Jephson and diving overboard into the canoe which he capsized. All hands in the capsized canoe and one in the other were killed.

As a result of the firing, three of the five vessels in harbor were run ashore. The other two moved up the river a short distance, where they were prepared for defense with such resolution that Robinson declined to engage them. Instead, he contented himself with kedging off one of the grounded vessels and returning to Canso.¹²¹

Whether or not this is the same engagement in which Blin featured so strongly would be hard to say. Certainly there are many similarities in the stories but there are sufficient discrepancies to indicate that they may well have been two separate ventures.¹²²

On June twenty-ninth the *Flying Horse*, a large schooner formerly in the West Indian trade, but now a privateer, presented her charges for a month's patrol to the eastward which amounted to a barrel of rum and six hundred thirty-two pounds, over four hundred pounds of which had been expended in ship's stores, including powder and ball. The bill was promptly paid and she was again sent to the eastward for another cruise.¹²³

Massachusetts Bay Proclaims War Against the Indians

By July twenty-fifth things had reached such a state that the governor was constrained to make the following declaration.

By His Excellency
 Samuel Shute Esquire;
 Captain General and Govenour in Chief over His Majestie's Province of
 The Massachusetts Bay in New England etc.
 A Declaration
 Against The Eastern Indians.

THE COMBATANTS LAY A COURSE TOWARD A CLIMAX

Whereas the Indians Inhabiting the Eastern Parts of this Province, Notwithstanding their Repeated Submissions to His Majesties Crown and Government Have for some years last past have appeared in considerable Numbers, and in an Hostile Manner and given Disturbance to His Majesties Subjects in the Eastern Parts of this Province . . . have lately . . . proceeded . . . to Assault, Take, Burn, and Destroy Vessels upon the Sea and Coasts and Houses and Mills upon the Land . . .

I do therefore, hereby Declare and Proclaim the said Eastern Indians, with their Confederates, to be Rebels, Traitors and Enemies to His Majesty King George . . .¹²⁴

Although the broadside had an iron ring we have seen, and shall see further, that if it were intended as a deterrent to stop raids on shipping it had small effect. On the eighth of August we learn that sixty men are "away on Cape Sable trying to recover vessels lately taken by the Indians there." But, sixty men do not appear to have been sufficient. On August eighteenth two more heavily armed vessels were fitted out and despatched to Cape Sable to try to recapture vessels taken there.¹²⁵

Despite galleys, sloops, shallops, whaleboats, offers for ransom, and declarations by the governor, scarcely half of the ships taken appear to have been returned. What became of the remaining vessels we are not sure. Perhaps they were sold to the French, perhaps destroyed, perhaps cast away or retained by their captors. The latter two possibilities are improbable, for had they been cast away we would have heard of them. Owing to the fact that the natives moved inland during the winter, it is unlikely that they were kept, although Mog, it will be recalled, held at least one vessel over the winter.

After so violent a year as 1722, it would be natural to expect some violence in 1723, but this does not appear to be the case. As far as can be determined from existing records, the natives made no marine forays during that year and the fleets were unmolested until 1724 which, in many respects, marks the zenith of aboriginal achievement in naval warfare.

The Indians' Nomadic Habits as Hunters and Fishermen

Heretofore all the attacks began in the summer or early spring and continued through August or, occasionally, September, and then broke off. Nor was this year an exception. This peculiarity is easily explained by the fact that the eastern tribes were highly nomadic. During the winter months, they lived in the interior, when the deep snow made the taking of moose and caribou relatively easy and the cold weather drove the seals and birds south and the ocean fish into the warmer regions of deep water. In order

to reach the hunting territories the tribes left early, while the rivers were still navigable, and there was yet time to set up camp before the winter snows began. Then, once located in the interior, they were forced to remain there until the spring breakup once more unlocked the rivers and made the journey to the coast easy. As a rule the natives would strike the coast about the same time that the alewives and salmon, important ingredients in the aboriginal diet, began to ascend the rivers to spawn.

If the Indians were nomadic, so were the fishermen and coasters. By the end of October the weather in the eastern regions was cold, the fishing began to abate and heavy gales became imminent. For the most part the vessels were small, poorly equipped against the cold, and poor sailers. It would have been folly to attempt to fish or to coast on a shore line unmarked with buoys or lights, poorly charted and studded with all kinds of hazards to navigation in vessels of the type used at that time. As a result, the smaller vessels were laid up in the fall and their crews went to work ashore in shipyards, logging or other trades. Larger ships took on cargoes of salt fish, lumber, stores, or rum and swung off for the West Indies to return again in the spring and join the newly fitted vessels that once more were plying the coast. Thus, it can readily be seen that, had the Indians stayed on the coast, there would have been little shipping activity to interest them that they could conceivably have captured.

The *Boston News Letter* for Thursday, February 20, 1724 to Thursday February twenty-seventh contains a proclamation for a general fast issued by Governor Dummer to be held for relief from the Indians, prosperity of the fisheries and that the coast be relieved from Indians and pirates. This would imply that the previous year had not been entirely free from trouble but, unfortunately, we have no way of proving this point. The fast was held, but its only effect seems to have been to create a hearty appetite among the populace.

The Fate of Captain Winslow and His Party

On the thirtieth of April Captain Josiah Winslow left the fort at St. George with seventeen men and two whaleboats with a dual purpose—to shoot Indians who were suspected of being in the neighborhood of the Greene Islands and to shoot fowl for the garrison if no Indians appeared. On the return trip, no hostiles having been sighted, the two boats became separated and a band of from two to three hundred Indians fell upon them. The whaleboat in command of one Harvey was fired upon so heavily, both from canoes and from the shore, that three men were killed, the boat hulled and they had to beach her, it being impossible to stay in her. Once beached

both boat and crew were captured. Winslow, hearing the noise, meanwhile, tried to effect a rescue but "thirty to forty canoes laid him board and board" but were beaten off and held at bay until dark when he landed with his three remaining men and was killed.¹²⁶

Undoubtedly this account is greatly exaggerated. It would be awkward for ten canoes, to say nothing of forty, to attempt coming alongside one whaleboat which is, at best, only twice as large as the average canoe. Further proof that this is an exaggeration may be deduced by the fact that in 1720 the best census available estimated all the eastern tribes as having a total strength of five hundred men.¹²⁷ However, the assault had its effect in arousing the populace.

In May, Dummer sent a letter to Colonel Westbrook in which he introduced a new defensive tactic in the marine war. He ordered Dummer to employ decoy fishing vessels to lure the enemy into imprudent attacks. In order that the ruse would be more effective, he requested that the vessels be manned by Indians from Cape Cod who had been hired as mercenaries.¹²⁸ Apparently the ruse was not overly successful for there are no accounts, glowing or otherwise, to tell us of Indians captured.

The Indian Privateersmen at Work

About the middle of June the Indians took eleven fishing vessels with a total complement of forty-five men. Of these, twenty-two were killed and twenty-three were made prisoner of whom several were wounded. Both ships and men were held for ransom—the price being fifty pounds per vessel and thirty pounds for each man. The captors further stipulated that the ransom be paid in three weeks time. As a result of this two vessels were immediately fitted out with twenty-five men each and sent to the eastward, where they joined two more heavily armed vessels of twenty men each from New Hampshire, to attempt a rescue.¹²⁹

Hard on the heels of this information came notice, on July thirteenth, that one "sconer," if not more, had taken "at least" one shallop. This advice had a double effect. On the one hand a group of fishermen wanted to set out in pursuit immediately; on the other, the House of Representatives was informed, July sixteenth, that two "sconers" of fourteen hands each were afraid to go East. Their crews begged that the government ransom "their friends and relations in Indian hands" along with the captured vessels.

Three days later Samuel Hicks of Piscatua volunteered to take his vessel and a heavily armed crew in pursuit of "the heavily armed Indian Pyrat who goes in a Marblehead Sconer with a great Gun that chases

Everything and has taken Many and has driven the Fishermen from the Sea."¹³⁰

More information on the attacks was carried in the *Boston News Letter* for July twenty-third, number 1070. The paper had received word from New Hampshire that on July seventeenth the Indians had captured two shallops belonging to the Isles of Shoals,¹³¹ although there is no evidence to prove they were actually captured there. Upon the receipt of this information, the Lieutenant Governor sent off two shallops, with twenty men each, to meet with Dr. George Jackson in a schooner, and Sylvester Lakeman in a shallop, with about twenty men apiece, from Maine, who were on the same mission.

On the same day that this news arrived word came from "Ipswitch" that the week before the natives had taken "several" fishing vessels and killed four men. The Lieutenant Governor again ordered the drum to be beaten for volunteers and two more vessels with fifty hands between them (one of them carrying six swivel guns) sailed in pursuit. "They were favored with a fair wind,"¹³² but little else as we shall soon see.

A week later news of the results of the privateer task force was released in Boston. Jackson and Lakeman met one of the enemy, a large schooner armed with two swivel guns, and attacked. They soon discovered that they had caught a tartar.

Action—Man-of-War Style

On July twenty-fourth Dr. Jackson and Captain Lakeman returned to New Hampshire. They fell in with a large Indian-manned schooner armed with two "patteraroes or swivel guns" and promptly engaged her. The Jackson schooner opened fire and the battle was hot. After the English had fired several volleys, apparently at long range, the Indian privateer brought her guns to bear on Jackson's vessel and opened fire. A "great shot" carried away Jackson's mainsheet and shrouds while the doctor was severely wounded with "three swan shot" fired from muskets. A musket ball put Jackson's mate out of commission and two other men were wounded. "However, Jackson and Lakeman so warmly plied the enemy that they ran into the Penobscot." What damage they sustained we cannot tell.¹³³

Obviously the *News Letter* has put the best face possible on what, no matter how regarded, was a bad situation for the English. A group of untutored savages had faced two of the King's privateers and severely damaged one. A native-manned vessel able to stand up to two privateers presented a hazard to the fishing fleet such as had never been posed before.

It was one thing for an Indian-manned vessel to chase, and occasionally capture, slightly manned fishermen, quite another to be able to pull the beard of a man-o-war. With such a vessel loose on the sea no fisherman was safe.

From the limited facts available we can piece together what happened with some accuracy. Jackson, having the larger vessel, undoubtedly outran Lakeman and, as he overhauled the schooner, opened fire. The fire which does not appear to have been returned—a strong indication of discipline among what were generally undisciplined crews. When Jackson was close aboard, the Indian hauled his wind and crossed, or attempted to cross, Jackson's bows—a naval tactic of the most approved kind, both then and now.

As he crossed Jackson's bows he delivered a broadside so well aimed that it cut down Jackson, his mate, and two men and what is more important, the cannoneers were sufficiently expert to shoot away Jackson's mainsheet and shrouds. To think that the English privateer could continue in the fray after this would be folly. His mainsail was useless and, with his rigging cut away, Jackson faced the choice of taking in his canvas or losing his spars.

After crippling Jackson, the Indian apparently kept away again and vanished into the Penobscot leaving the shallop, who would have had little chance to, and probably little stomach for closing and continuing the engagement, to assist the Jackson schooner in making repairs and limping back to New Hampshire.

Upon receipt of this information the government of Boston sent out immediately a sloop and two schooners, manned with forty men each, under the command of Lt. Chambers to try to find this most dangerous adversary.¹³⁴ However, Chambers does not seem to have been successful, for on August tenth, J. Marjory of Salem was commissioned to take the sloop *Lark* and a whaleboat after "Indian pirates."¹³⁵ This made a total of at least fifteen vessels all actively seeking the privateers, and not one of which carried much less than two score men.

Meanwhile, at Mt. Desert, one Cox of Dorchester was lying at anchor at daylight on the morning of July twenty-seventh, in company of two other heavily armed schooners when another schooner was seen beating into the harbor manned by Indians. Cox and his consorts immediately made sail and closed with the natives who, seeing themselves surrounded, dove overboard and swam ashore. The Cox party opened fire with twenty guns and on their second volley wounded two as they reached shore. The rest, Cox averred, built a barricade and fired upon the English,

heavily wounding two men. The English boarded their schooner and had another man wounded. This contest continued at a range of "three rods" for nearly four hours, with no harm done on either side, until the English withdrew with the schooner.¹³⁶

Again one is forced to wonder at this account. Although all the Indians dove overboard and "swam ashore," an Englishman was wounded "boarding their vessel." How did they manage to swim ashore and still provide themselves with sufficient dry powder and ball to carry on a battle for four hours? Why didn't they ground their schooner if only fifty feet from the beach or, for that matter, with only fifty feet to go and under sail, why didn't the schooner beach herself?

The account hardly seems plausible as it stands, yet we have insufficient evidence to conjecture more than that the battle took place in what is now known as Southwest Harbor. That is the only port on Mt. Desert where one could be fifty feet from shore, and still float a schooner, without having the crew on the beach fire down into the attacking vessels from cliffs. The account specifically reads that, "we" (the English) "fired down on them and they up on us."

This seems to conclude the known incidents concerning naval engagements between whites and red men for the year. Undoubtedly the large number of privateers out on scout made the natives very wary on the one hand, and the reports of heavily armed Indian schooners abroad, and apparently of unknown whereabouts, served to dampen the zest of the English for fishing. Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that we have no further accounts of assaults for the year.

*V THE TIDE OF WAR SETS
IN FAVOR OF THE WHITE MAN*

With the coming of the winter of 1724 a change appears to have taken place in the culture of the primitives. That change became more noticeable during 1725 and 1726.

From accounts dated 1725 and later we learn that large numbers of the schooners captured during the previous year were held by the natives over the winter. Whether they were hidden away and laid up in deserted coves and unfrequented inlets on the Maine coast, or whether they were sailed to French Canada, we can not tell. Certainly such a trip, undertaken so late in the year, would be highly difficult and hazardous yet it could have been done and would have been worthwhile. A vessel in French Canada could be more easily fitted out with powder, ball and naval stores than she could in English-held Maine or Nova Scotia. Undoubtedly, some vessels made the trip while the rest remained hidden. However, with the natives away on their inland hunting grounds, it would not have been difficult for the English to ferret out such vessels and either bring them back to English ports or destroy them. In order to prevent this at least some of the Penobscots, Micmacs and related bands would perforce have to stay and keep watch over them. This they must have done, since in 1725 we read of vessels "taken last year by the indian pyrats are out."¹³⁷ A letter from Colonel Westbrook to Lieutenant Governor Dummer refers to "2 of the sconers taken last year are out"¹³⁸

Also in 1725 we learn of a new use to which the captured vessels were put. The native population had been decreasing and the white assaults on land had been growing steadily more severe. Father Ralle's war had seen the destruction of the Penobscot town and since that time the whites had been assiduous in destroying Indian villages and plantings wherever they could find them. The growing of food was denied them and the danger of attack made impracticable the use of weirs to catch spawning fish. As a result of this the Indians apparently put the whole family aboard and used the schooners and shallops to fish and seal from. In fact, during 1725 and 1726 they appear almost to have developed a floating culture. In the above mentioned letter from Westbrook to Dummer we learn that, "Saccaristis affirms that 2 of the sconers are to go fishing . . . and they have taken seals at Grand Manan and St. Johns."¹³⁹ Giles mentions that they "were sealing

on Matinicus" and there are several other references to this fact. However, let us return to the fighting.

Recruiting Indian to Fight Indian

On May eighteenth, the government sent a sloop to Barnstable, Cape Cod, to enlist the aid of the Indians living there in hunting down the Eastern Indians at sea. To this they agreed, providing they were allowed to return home by September to attend to the whale fishery, "which they do at this time."¹⁴⁰ The following week the Lieutenant Governor ordered Captain Cornwell to take two sloops and fifty men on a forty-day cruise as far east as Machias. His orders were to act like a fisherman and attempt to lure the natives into sea fights in the bays.¹⁴¹ Unfortunately, the plan does not appear to have worked for Cornwell returned empty handed. Meanwhile, a new plan had been devised wherein the consenting Barnstable Indians went to the eastward to act as decoys in whaleboats, an extremely wise choice as these Indians were well acquainted with that type of vessel.¹⁴²

No real accounts of strife occurred, however, until July sixth when Captain Barns, in a sloop, spoke one James Marsh, fisherman, who declared that shortly before this he had been fishing off Cape Neger (Cape Negro, Nova Scotia) when the fleet was set upon by approximately one hundred Indians. They captured five vessels, imprisoned the crews and then manned one vessel and gave him chase. Fortunately for Marsh, some time was consumed while the Indians transferred crews, and the Englishman, having a smart sailer under him, plus a head start, eventually managed to give his pursuers the slip.¹⁴³

On July ninth, in response to this news, the government ordered one Captain Slocum to sea in a privateer to assist Captain Sanders, already out, against "Indian privateers."

However, except for a letter from one Samuel Stacey to Governor Dummer, wherein the Governor is requested to return a vessel belonging to the said Stacey and another owned by John Champman and his servant,¹⁴⁴ the year 1725 seems to have included no other major, hostile engagements. When compared with the events of 1724, this lack of hostile engagements would seem to have classified this as a fairly peaceful year for the fisheries and the coasting trade. Undoubtedly this peace was due, in large measure, to the abnormally large number of prowling privateersmen out from the end of 1724 through 1725.

A Trade Treaty Serves Only as a Lull

1726 was to take on a new and very different color. In April Governor

Dummer stated that both French and Indians were expected to come down the Kennebec daily and suggested that better trade agreements with the latter might secure a peace.¹⁴⁵ There then followed a long period of waiting and hoping until, finally, on July 14, 1726, the governor "attended by several gentlemen of His Majestie's council" sailed to Casco to ratify the peace with the "Eastern Tribes."¹⁴⁶ He returned August 18 with the treaty signed.

On his return he had this to say regarding the treaty: "... having reason to hope it will be a lasting one if we steadily pursue the measures which in some articles will require the help of the legislature . . . I think myself obliged . . . to recommend to you that special care be now taken to guard the trade with them as much as possible against corruption, as also to determine an equal and speedy determination of all causes and controversies that are or shall arise between the English which has been solemnly promised them, which, if it be punctually performed shall have a great tendency toward the perpetuating of this peace."¹⁴⁷

Despite the apparent good news of the treaty, trouble was to come within a few days. On Saturday, September 3, a fishing vessel came in from Maine, Dowdy master, who brought two Frenchmen, three Indian men, a squaw and two babies as prisoners. According to Dowdy, the captives with three other Indians came aboard the vessel as she lay at anchor. They talked about the peace and pretended friendship.

Suddenly, one of the Frenchmen, while the master and some of the crew were ashore, struck the colors, snapped a pistol at one of the men and ordered the hands to submit. They did so, and the captors then told the hands ashore to come aboard and receive good quarter. However, as soon as the shore party returned the hostiles fell upon them with cutlasses and threatened to kill one of the Englishmen, who promptly ran down into the hold and hid.

Dowdy was then ordered to make sail after another vessel which he did. When they came up with her they found that she was a Frenchman and they let her go. Eventually Captain Dowdy managed to get into his cabin and barricade himself. Meanwhile a seaman knocked the Frenchman guarding the guns on the head and forced him to jump overboard. Dowdy, from the vantage of the cabin, fired into the crowd on deck, whereupon three Indians dove overboard and swam off even though the vessel was over a mile from shore. The rest surrendered.¹⁴⁸

On the fourth of October the two Frenchmen, father and son, were tried and found guilty of piracy and sentenced to be hanged, as were the three Indians who were tried the next day. On Wednesday, November

the second, all five were executed.¹⁴⁹ The fate of the woman and the two infants is not known.

What actually happened in Maine we can not tell. However, there are some unusual circumstances connected with the whole affair. It was not customary for Indians to go into battle with their women and children. Further, no Englishmen were killed nor were the parties concerned pirates in the true sense, for they did not harm the French vessel. To be sure, piracy was a crime punishable by death but the death penalty was usually invoked only when murder was committed along with the seizure. Furthermore, a trial for piracy usually took a considerable period of time.

But in this case only a few hours were employed to convict five persons and send them to the gallows. Perhaps this was what Governor Dummer meant when he proposed a "speedy determination of all contraversies" between Indians and English. At any rate, when viewed in retrospect, such dealings could little help the peace of 1726.

Although this discussion terminates with the peace of 1726 it is not to be assumed that after that year no more sea depredations took place. Far from it. In 1727 Giles wrote that a Penobscot chief wanted the "sconer" he captured in 1726. He had subsequently allowed its use by some prisoners to transport themselves back to the English, and now wanted it either returned to him or paid for.¹⁵⁰ In May of 1728 a letter from Dummer states that the Indians had assembled at Annapolis. They intended to attack the fishery in retaliation for what the English did to Indian privateers in 1726.¹⁵¹

In October of the same year, it appears that the mast fleet was "annoyed" by Indian attacks in Casco Bay.¹⁵² Even as late as 1757 there is reason to believe that the Indians were active at sea for, according to an inscription on a stone on Matinicus Island, one Ebenezer Hall, the first settler (so reads the inscription) was killed by hostiles as he set foot on the island. A legend told by Dalton Raines of Matinicus Island, in the summer of 1953, recounts that Indians attacked the town of Vinal Haven and the citizenry took refuge on a small island in the harbour. The savages came in canoes and killed everyone on the islet, which is known today as Murder Island and bears mute testimony to what happened so long ago by having red striations in the rock formation. These striations are believed by the present inhabitants to be the blood stains of the victims murdered there.

V I T H E I N D I A N S E A F A R E R H A S F E W R E P L A C E M E N T S

The reasons for terminating this paper in 1726 are several. A peace is always a propitious time to end a discussion of warfare, no matter how uneasy the peace may be. But there are better reasons. By 1726 the native sea-arm had completed its various stages of evolution and nothing new or particularly remarkable appears to have transpired after this date. By 1726 the Indian population native to the shores of Maine and Nova Scotia had been heavily reduced through the ravages of war (the Beothuk had long since been destroyed as a serious threat) and at the same time the English had substantially increased in power and in numbers. As a result, any further serious attacks of a damaging nature were beyond the capabilities of the native population indigenous to those parts. They must perforce be considered as annoying raids such as those of Geronimo, in the Southwest, at the outset of the present century. War on a major scale was no longer a real threat, and we are left with the task of evaluating what had occurred in over two hundred long, bloody and bitter years.

Before going into any evaluation, however, it is important that one point be stressed. It is not to be construed that the engagements listed in this paper are the only ones that transpired. Rather, they are the more noteworthy ones. Although the records of the times were rigorously examined there undoubtedly have been many documents that have been overlooked. And, even if every document had been carefully scanned and annotated, the list, although larger, would have still remained incomplete.

How many vessels, at and before the dawn of recorded history, sailed from European ports never to return? Some were wrecked, some taken by pirates, others foundered. Is it not also possible that still others fell in with the North American coast and were taken by natives, as the shallop Gosnold saw off Cape Neddick that foggy May morning in 1602?

How many vessels went out in colonial times and never were heard from again? Were they all cast away or sunk, or were they perhaps victims of an Indian attack that never was recorded because there were no European survivors to tell what happened? It is to be remembered that the fate of Monsieur Le Capitain Fitch on Cape Cod is known to us

only by purest accident. The list as it is compiled here indicates merely that there were attacks, the nature of these attacks, and some of the results. Let us now evaluate the evidence of two centuries and see what turns up.

The Three Patterns of the Sea Fights

From the foregoing pages it is reasonably evident that these sea fights fell into three patterns: three geographical patterns, three patterns historically, and three patterns of warfare. The earliest fighting mentioned is that which took place during the initial periods of European-Indian contact and terminated shortly before the Pequot war. Most of the fighting seems to have taken place from Newfoundland westward to Cape Cod, with the majority of it concentrated in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Maine.

It was not until almost the close of the period, in 1614, that Cape Cod featured heavily, in the burning of the French trader mentioned earlier. This, in all probability, can easily be explained by the fact that these were the regions to be first populated and explored by Europeans, and wherever Europeans touched it was not long before hostilities broke out. Southern New England, although touched early, was, for various reasons, not heavily populated until after the coming of the Plymouth Colony. The earliest large group to come to North America included many fishermen. But since there was an abundance of fish east of Cape Cod, and since the cape was a desperate place for shipping, the fishermen gave it a berth and took their catches off the more easterly coasts. Here good harbours were numerous and the distances home somewhat shorter.

Very little is known about these earliest engagements. A broken sword, a native-manned shallop are the principal clues we have to early assaults. Thanks to Jones and to Hunt and to the others we do know that the first engagements were usually on a minor scale. A whaleboat was captured here, another set upon there. In most cases the boats were cut adrift from the mother ship, hauled up on the shingle and defended from shore. The attacks suffered by Champlain, by Smith, and by many others seem to have been launched from the beach, with Indians shooting arrows from vantage points along the cliffs at a passing or embayed vessel. Only occasionally do we find any sea attacks, such as occurred at Fort Popham, where canoes lay a whaleboat board and board and took her in the hand-to-hand fighting that followed. About the only significant development during this period seems to have been that of laying down a barrage of arrows from canoes to pin down Europeans while tenders and longboats were cut adrift.

During this early period there seems to be a good deal of doubt as to the ultimate purpose that the natives hoped to achieve by capturing

ships. There is also doubt concerning the use they intended to make of these vessels. Certainly the shallop seen by Gosnold was being employed as a means of transportation and may well have come from Newfoundland, since her crew seemed acquainted with those far-distant shores. Too, she may have been used for fishing. On the other hand, the pains that the Indians took to take Hunt's longboat at Monhegan does not seem to make sense. Was such a small boat worth such tremendous exertion to the natives for transportation and fishing purposes? Did they capture her to use later as a vessel in which to attack European vessels? If the latter was the case it was a poor risk for, although undoubtedly better suited to attack wooden vessels than a bark canoe, it was still pitifully small to be of much use in taking a large ship.

From the details presented, there is considerable evidence to support the theory that the vessels, taken during this period, were captured for one of two reasons. They were taken intact because the natives linked the boats of Europeans to the white man spiritually, much as the Aztecs linked horse and rider together in the time of Cortez or because, and this seems more probable, they felt that keeping her so was an awful show of power that would substantially discourage further European familiarity with the coast and the inhabitants thereof.

Stratagem is a Last Resort

The second period of assault began shortly before the Pequot war and terminated shortly after its close. This phase was located almost wholly West of Cape Cod, stretching through Buzzard's Bay, Block and Long Island sounds. If the first or contact period is poorly documented the second stage is over-documented to the extent that there is much conflicting evidence in existing records about what did and did not occur. However, thanks to the abundance of material, there is little doubt as to method and purpose of these attacks.

In many respects the taking of the Frenchman at Cape Cod, although occurring many years earlier than the Pequot war, is most closely linked to these later attacks. In the majority of cases the Indians came aboard in the guise of traders and, when sufficient numbers were on deck, they fell upon the crews and despatched them. Occasionally when smaller boats were concerned they fired upon them as they passed close to some headland or island and took them in this manner. Only rarely did they engage from canoes although canoe warfare was not unknown to them.¹⁵³

These attacks seem to have taken place primarily in rivers and harbours and the purpose of the attacks is quite clear. In every case, save one, the

vessels taken were summarily burned and sunk as a means of avenging an injury which the natives felt had been committed upon them by the whites. In the lone case in doubt, Oldham's ship taken at Block Island, there is doubt as to the intended purpose. But this doubt arises from the fact that she was retaken almost immediately. True, she was afloat but, since the Pequots made no attempt either to run off with her or defend her, it seems clear that she too would have been destroyed.

One can not help but wonder why attacks in this area were so seldom carried on from the sea. The dugout—the principal canoe in this region—was more stable and bullet-proof and so much better suited to the needs of naval warfare than the bark canoes used further to the eastward. Nor, for that matter, can one help wondering why the prizes were destroyed. Both questions are not overly difficult to answer.

The answers to these two questions lie in the cultural background and the topography of the region under discussion. To fight vessels successfully, the crew had, necessarily, to be at ease with a roving life. The sedentary person seldom went to sea, unless pressed, and then did not make a particularly satisfactory seaman. The Pequots, the Wampanaug and the Narragansetts, the three tribes most concerned in the Pequot war and the second period of warfare, unlike their brothers further to the eastward, were not particularly nomadic. Good seamen they were without a doubt, but any roving, save out to the islands, was more or less foreign to their culture.

On the other hand, the Micmac and Penobscots were constantly on the move over a region that had as borders, the St. Lawrence, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Massachusetts. The southern tribes appear to have remained more or less stationary and contented themselves with occasional journeys that seldom went further than northern Massachusetts and western Connecticut. Their ideas of warfare seemed chiefly to revolve around the defense of their own territory. By nature sedentary and disinclined to far forays afield, they were disinclined to fight on the high seas.

Southern New England was not like Maine and the Maritimes, with their numerous protected and hidden harbours, their sparse English population and the banks of fog that hung offshore all summer. All these factors for sudden forays and gave reasonable chances for immunity from pursuit. By 1635, southern New England, was well on its way to becoming an English land and an English sea. Fogs were rare¹⁵⁴ and harbours were relatively few. Narragansett Bay, Boston, and New London were populated early.

For a hundred and twenty-odd miles southern New England fronted on Long Island Sound, a body of water scarcely fifteen miles across, guarded

THE INDIAN SEAFARER HAS FEW REPLACEMENTS

by narrow entrances controlled by the white settlers. Had the Indians attempted to fight a ship they could have had little hope of success. Without a harbour in which to lie snug for repairs, without a fog bank to dodge into; with only a dozen islands with no adequate shelter on them; with Bermuda, the nearest land off the coast fifteen hundred miles away, Indian privateers could expect a successful survival ration somewhat comparable to the proverbial "snowball in Hades." Their only hope would have been to go around Cape Cod, a hazard looked upon to this day by seamen with some dismay, and operate in Maine where they would have had to face a hostile native population, as well as the English, and it is already apparent that they were not culturally inclined to such an Ishmaelitic life.

VII THE WAR'S FINAL FLAME HAS THE HOTTEST FIRE

The third and final stage of fighting began shortly after the Pequot War. It was, in reality, little more than a continuation of what had been going on since 1500 but had been submerged, temporarily, by events to the south. This last period seems to have smouldered and waxed and smouldered and waxed again for almost a century. During that period the Indian sea arm was developed to its fullest extent—and during that time more vessels were known to have been captured and more men known to have been killed than in the entire history of Indian sea campaigns prior to this date. It is safe to say that, nowhere in North American waters, did a war last so long nor cost Europeans so heavily in ships, in men, money and in prestige.

Before the final stage was well under way the Beothuks and the tribes in southern New England had been so decimated that they no longer posed a threat. As a result, the area of attack became considerably smaller. Seldom did fighting occur further west than the Isles of Shoals nor east of Cape Breton. As the years went by the fighting became concentrated even more within the regions immediately surrounding Cape Sable, Casco and Penobscot Bays.

These regions were tailor-made for a vessel that wished to elude pursuit and strike suddenly. They were areas where the apparently ever-unwary fishermen were prone to congregate. Further, they were home waters of the two tribes carrying on the struggle after the other tribes had been broken through the ravages of war. Cape Sable was home territory to the Micmacs; Penobscot and Casco Bays to the Penobscots.

The Objectives—Revenge, Plunder, Ransom

The reasons for taking ships in this period were clear-cut and fell into several very distinct patterns. Under Chief Mugg the aim appears to have been to capture white vessels for the purpose of making up an Indian marine arm. The flotilla was to be used to drive the English westward and finally occupy the islands off Boston, blockade the port and eventually clear all the region east of Cape Cod of Englishmen. In theory this was a feasible plan and Mugg went more than a little way in its development.

He disrupted trade with Maine, he built up a fleet and became a thorn

in the English side. Had he survived it is possible that he could have become considerably more than a mere thorn. However, he was a man ahead of his time. His crews were ill-equipped and therefore were able to take only small to medium sized vessels. He lacked naval stores, great guns and ammunition. Further, he seems to have suffered from a paucity of seamen capable of handling sailing ships.

With Mugg's death the natives appear to have abandoned, temporarily at least, any organized plan for a fleet and contented themselves with harrying the fisheries for a triple purpose, revenge, plunder, and, for the first time, ransom. A captured vessel would bring fifty pounds and the crew twenty to thirty pounds apiece. A medium sized vessel meant at least a cool hundred pounds, ship and crew together. Further, captured crews were exchange goods that could be traded at the conference table for Indian prisoners.

After a few years of capturing vessels primarily for ransom purposes the old ideas of Mugg, perhaps unintentionally, were resurrected on a modified scale. After Mugg, the idea of a real native navy was never mentioned—indeed, such an idea would have been wholly unpracticable for many reasons. The new plan was to capture vessels and turn them into privateers which was done most successfully as we saw in 1723.

Ruses Are Only Delaying Actions

The final development began about 1724 and extended beyond the bounds of this discussion. With the English marching up and down in the land, burning villages, destroying crops and killing every red man, women and child they could lay hand to, the already badly weakened native population, unable to elude or defend itself from the enemy, was faced with either death by starvation or death by the sword. Many of them, as a last desperate measure, began to take ships, not for battle or ransom but as a new home. They could live aboard and survive by sealing and fishing. The men were near their families and could defend them and, at the same time, they had a reasonably comfortable home that could be moved about more or less at will and kept out of the hands of the enemy. On board ship there was no need to defend a village—the village simply fled and the sea left no trail to follow.

During this final phase many ruses and tactics were employed. Cables were cut during an onshore breeze and the crew kept pinned down until the vessel grounded and then the vessel plied so warmly that the crew gave up. Flaming arrows (for want of hot shot) and fireships were used. If these tactics weren't always successful it was not through the fault of the

attackers but through quirks of nature that they failed. Captured vessels were run in under protecting muskets and sprung around, just as in the best naval practice to present a broadside to the enemy. When worth keeping, the vessels were defended so hotly that the English often retreated. Finally, captured vessels were often fought with a degree of sagacity that in the approved tactics of the day would have met stiff naval requirements.

However, the most successful means of assault seems to have been a modification of the oldest tactic used. The natives either came aboard ostensibly to trade or else several canoes would dart out upon an unwary enemy, preferably at dawn or at dusk, and gain the vessel with a sudden, concentrated rush. The vessel would then be put about, the natives would conceal themselves, and they would pursue another and larger vessel, lay her by the board and take her with a rush. If strong enough they would then repeat the procedure from the newest prize—a technique long employed by pirates who from skiffs would first seize a small vessel and gradually work up to a ship of a suitable size which they would use until something more satisfactory came along.

The Indian as a Boatbuilder

We have already seen that the groups occupying the seacoast were good small boat handlers. They were capable of considerable voyages and were fearless in sea engagements. According to Archer and others they harpooned whales, or at least drove them ashore with spears and other weapons. In the eyes of some they were even considered as the original teachers of the English in the art of whaling. Certainly the Barnstable Indians appear to have included whaling as a major part of their economy in 1726. In order to take whales it was necessary to have heavy lines. These they had, made from milkweed in short length at native rope-walks.¹⁵⁵ Some of this line was as much as two inches thick and in lengths up to ten feet. Such rope, spliced, could well be used for standing rigging. Timber, of course, was plentiful and so was pitch. We have already seen that the natives had already developed a caulking compound for canoes that would have been suitable for caulking wooden vessels.

However valuable timber, caulking and line may be in the shipping industry, they are not in themselves sufficient. Tools, canvas, slips, know-how and, above all, iron are essential. Also essential are ports where ship-building and repairs can be carried out without interruption. Of all the things mentioned this last item is, perhaps, the most essential, and this item the natives lacked completely. Early in periods under discussion, it is

true that they did have the facilities for shipbuilding but, until late in the seventeenth century, they lacked iron and shipwrights, and they had relatively few seamen. Further, novel ideas are often slow to develop in primitive peoples and it is doubtful if the thought, or indeed the necessity, of creating a navy even dawned upon them. To capture ships and perhaps to build whaleboats obviously was in their minds, but the concept of sailing vessels was not.

By the end of the seventeenth century they appear to have been inclined toward the maritime. They had shiphandlers and apparently riggers for they appear to have fitted out the ship they took fresh from the stocks at New Dartmouth. But they still lacked ship or blacksmiths—numerous treaties bargain for blacksmiths to become resident with the population—and they had no place free from attack for shipbuilding.

After 1675 the English were here in such numbers that anywhere the natives might attempt to go, that had an access to the sea, could and would undoubtedly have been taken. Homes laid waste, gardens destroyed, the Indian was forced to wander in small groups from place to place in order to gain the necessities of life. No longer was a Nourumbeage possible. The Indians obviously realized this and appear to have made no attempts at shipbuilding. Their vessels had, perforce, to come to them by capture.

It is true that both Hudson and Gosnold saw native-manned European vessels on this coast. We also are fairly certain that by 1600 sailing was either a new and crude art among the natives, or else one that had been slightly adapted from the Breton fishermen and by contact with explorers and traders on whose ships a few natives were used as pilots. A few had even gone to Europe as unwilling guests or slaves on white vessels. Of these, a small number won their way back to North America and were but a handful even when considered as a whole. Further, without ships they would have had little hope of instructing their brethren in the art. Where, then did the quantities of natives that were operating schooners, ketches and the like gain their sailing knowledge? (It is to be remembered that Mogg was forced to use English sailing masters on his ketch, obviously because he lacked sailors among his own people.)

Indian seamen appear to have learned their business in three distinct schools—if we exclude the few that were taken aboard the early explorers and fishermen as being too meager a number to have had much effect upon the people as a whole. They learned from the French, who took them fishing and later used them as crews on privateers, as we have already noted. They learned to sail in the English coasters and merchant marine, where

it appears they sailed in large numbers with or without their consent. In fact there were so many pressed native seamen that Sewall felt constrained to write a petition. This he presented to the general court to make it unlawful to conscript Indians for crews in English vessels.¹⁵⁶ The petition was denied which leads us to assume that they had considerable ability as seamen, and it was felt that they were a sufficient asset aboard ship to warrant the continued pressing of them for that end. Finally, they learned their trade with the pirates.

VIII RETREAT FROM THE SEA — AND THE FIGHT

During the closing years of the seventeenth and the first quarter of the eighteenth centuries the entire New England Coast as well as the coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were heavily infested with rovers. The pirates seem to have had a predictable pattern which they followed each year. A small band of merchant seamen, most often in the Caribbean, would either mutiny and capture their ship or else they would desert and later attack a small vessel from skiffs or canoes.

In the winter months they would worry the shipping in the warm seas. In the spring they would careen their vessels and then, as the West Indian trade slackened, they would run up the coast before the southwesterlies and harry the shipping off Connecticut and Rhode Island. As the season advanced gradually work on up the coast as far as Newfoundland. When the northwesterners began to blow in the fall they would once again sail for the warm seas before a favorable wind. Because of their limited number initially, because of the hazards of their profession, and because of their habit of constantly acquiring larger vessels and attempting to make up a fleet, they were chronically short-handed.

To make up for this deficiency they were wont to press captured crews to augment their numbers and while on the coast they appear to have forced numbers of Indians to join them—not a few of whom were subsequently captured and made the adornment on the end of a rope. We are unable to say how many Indians were engaged in this traffic. Only those who were hanged do we hear much about. Nevertheless this was an important school in which to learn the arts of marine warfare.

By necessity the pirate had to be a master at ship handling. He had to know how to drive a vessel to her limit; he had to know every ruse to escape detection, to effect surprise and to elude pursuit. He had rigid rules of discipline and most important of all he carried heavy ordnance and knew how to use it. For a vessel to whom all ports were barred, powder and ball were not easily come by. The gunner had to conserve ammunition and be accurate with his shots, not only to save powder but to disable his target without sinking her before she could be looted.

An Indian who had taken a cruise under the black flag, and then returned to his people, would know how to handle "great guns" and all the rest.

Aboard a schooner or ketch preying on fishermen and coasters he would be a valuable asset. Although it can not be proved that this is where a large portion of the native privateersmen had their instruction, we know that Indians were numbered among pirate crews and we have seen that the tactics employed by the natives were quite similar to those used by the freebooters. Therefore, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that they learned these tactics under the "black flag."

This pirate training is, I think, extremely important, even more important than an education under the flag of a French privateer. The reason is simple. The Frenchman was an excellent sea-fighter, but when compared to the "gentlemen of the account" his position was analogous to the old fable of the hound who pursued the rabbit. The rabbit escaped because he was running for his life while the hound merely ran for his dinner. The Frenchman fought bravely, but he knew that if he was captured the worst he would be likely to receive would be a prison term ending with prisoner exchange or, at worst, with cessation of hostilities.

The pirate on the other hand could expect, at the very best, a lifetime of prison preceded by torture or, more likely, torture, trial and death as a public show at the end of a rope. As a final ignominy, if more were necessary, he knew he would either be buried in an unmarked grave on some tidal flat or exposed in chains—in either case his very soul was in jeopardy. Such a man, like the hare, would employ a considerable amount of care in planning an attack, and preparing a retreat. If cornered he would fight with more ardor than the privateersman. Such was the training necessary for an Indian navy, against whom the hand of the English was turned and from whose grasp the most probable release was death.

The White Man's Cannon Proves an Elusive Prize

Since the attacks on English vessels appear to have been so successful one may wonder why the vessels were held for ransom so often—only comparatively rarely were fought, especially when those fights often went in favor of the natives. Aside from reasons already listed there is another one. In order to fight ships against ships it was necessary to have ordnance. Musket fire, no matter how heavy, could have little effect against heavy wooden sides, and an English crew usually had merely to lie low and wait out the storm before bringing their own cannon to bear. As has been seen, most of the vessels taken by the red men were fishermen and were not equipped with much (if any) heavy artillery.

Further, when one fired a ship's cannon one fired away a quart or more powder and a couple of pounds at least of shot. Should the

vessel, manned by the native crew, attempt to take an Englishman who was determined to resist a great many rounds of musket fire would be needed to accomplish this feat, and even then the issue might not come to a successful conclusion and the quarry might well escape.

An adequate supply of powder and shot was always a pressing matter to the native who had to depend on Europeans for his supply. Cannon were not easily come by. When they were captured or otherwise obtained the natives seem to have felt that such weapons could be better used to defend the home villages from attack. The native appears to have felt, with a good deal of justification, that his uncertain supply of powder and shot could best be used in cannon. He had fired his small shot in volleys against men encased in wooden hulls, and knew it would be better expended by the quart from the maw of a cannon, not to be deflected by an unexpected heave of the ship. He would prefer parcelling the powder out a dram or so at a time from ambush, with a tree to steady one's aim, against an exposed and relatively unsuspecting enemy, or have it fired from "greate guns" in defense of hearth and home where cannon would be least likely to be suspected.

Employed in this manner a hundred rounds of ammunition would be far more effective in the number of men killed than if used at sea. This, perhaps, is why they preferred to take ships by sudden and unexpected assaults by canoes. Such attacks required a minimum of powder for maximum results. Indeed, when surprise was to be attempted, the knife, the bow, and the hatchet were preferable and equally effective. Later the ransom of the ship would buy more guns and powder to be used, mostly, ashore.

As the war progressed the French were driven further and further from the scene and the Dutch were dispossessed of New Amsterdam. After the fall of Nova Scotia, the chief French arsenal, the Indians could fill their powder horns only at Quebec. No longer could powder be obtained from Baron Castine in Maine nor at Digby, nor the other French forts. Where, then, did the ammunition and weapons come from? Some came via courier du bois, some direct from Quebec itself, some, undoubtedly, from privateers and no small amount from the hazards of war but there was another source—English gunrunners.

Illegal Traffic Beclouds the Issue

Throughout the history of the wars there is constant reference made to both legal and illegal traffic in guns. English merchants wanted furs and the best commodity for trade was guns and ammunition. Very early in the period, Thomas Morton was driven from the country and Merrymount

destroyed. This was not as Bradford and Morton himself would have one believe, because of the erection of a Maypole and the singing of May songs, but, because Morton was trafficking with the Indians for fur and the media of exchange were muskets, powder, and shot.

From the time of Morton to the date on which this paper terminates there are constant petitions, most of which were ignored, to the general court begging that the Indians be no longer supplied with weapons and that they be made to give up those that they already had. The court refused to hear these petitions because they said that by trading guns to the native they gained his favour and helped estrange him from the French. If they denied him weapons they jeopardized a valuable fur trade and alienated him from the English cause. Besides, they argued, if the English wouldn't give him guns he could always get them from the French and they would thereby have his furs as well as his affections and all the English would have would be his animosity. In all justification to the petitioners, the course of history from 1635 to 1726 indicates that selling guns to the primitives did not in any way alleviate the war which raged almost continuously during that time, albeit it may have profited the fur trade.

Actually the differences between Indian and Englishman was one that went deeper than guns. It was an animosity that stemmed from the English wanting the land of the native, from a double standard at law that favored the white and hindered the native, and a basic cultural difference between the two that made the Englishman consider his red brother on an equal footing with his domesticated swine. Under such conditions (in justification of the court) the deprivation of guns would have done little more than stir the coals of hatred to a still hotter degree.

Of all the gunrunners, and there were many, there is evidence that perhaps his Excellency Governor Dudley, and his son whom he made customs officer, coupled with their helpers, were perhaps the most important. Of course it may well be true that a man's good is often buried with him, and if Dudley lacked friends to keep his honor bright, he certainly did not want for enemies to tarnish it. But usually where there is smoke there is fire.

In London in 1707 there was circulated a pamphlet, charging that Dudley and his son with one Lawton and Veal did pilfer the public arsenal, and send arms and ammunition of all sorts to the heathen, who used it to what good advantage we have already seen. Just how much truth there is in these statements would be hard to prove at so late a date, but three things seem to lead one to give credence to the statements made. The character

of Dudley would not make it inconsistent of him to be a gunrunner. With numerous posts about, that his offspring could have held, it is curious that he should become customs officer in charge of clearing ships in and out of Boston unless for some reason; part of which could have been gun-running. Obviously, such a set-up would have been propitious for acts of this nature. Finally it is to be noted that when Dudley returned to England, where he had considerable influence, this was one charge from which he was never able to completely free himself though he was never convicted. However, this is a subject that is beyond the scope of the present writing. Let us return to an appraisal of what few facts remain.

The Indian Was Not a Pirate

Before concluding this paper it is necessary that we clear up an important misconception that was strong in the mind of the Colonials and still is present today. This is the question of piracy. In Colonial times the Indians were often called and usually treated as pirates and casual reference to these sea battles usually elicits the remark from the listener, "Oh so they were pirates?" It does not seem to the writer that the Indians at any time in the history we have discussed ever could be accused of piracy. A pirate is an enemy of all mankind. He attacks ships of every nation and holds allegiance to no one save himself and his fellow brigands.

From the beginning of this narrative until 1726 we do not find a single reference of intribal warfare. Nor do we have any references of warfare between tribes—if we exclude the paid mercenaries from Barnstable who fought under English captains. Further, we know definitely that when the war broke out between the English and French, the Indians refrained from taking French vessels but contented themselves with English. During this latter time we have no evidence to demonstrate that they took vessels under any other European flag except the Union Jack.

The pirate preyed on merchant shipping. He was sudden in his assaults. He preferred to run unless victory was assured. His initial capture—for want of other means—usually was a surprise invasion from small boats and he changed vessels as opportunity arose. He often tortured the crews and held them for ransom. Most of these things the Indians did do. So did all privateers from all nations. The Indians do not appear to have tortured their prisoners beyond cuffing them about with a zeal not much greater than displayed on English privateersmen of the day. There is not a single incident among the Indians of broiling the lips of a captured man as did Ned Lowe and his cutthroats. Most important they preyed only upon European

shipping and during the later stages only upon English vessels. Because of this, although they sailed under no flag and without letters of marque, we must consider them in the light of privateersmen.

J. Frank Dobie, in his excellent book *The Mustangs*, has given us a splendid picture of how the horse changed the life of the Plains Indian. He points out that, accomplished horsemen though they were, for the Indian the horse was recognized as a useful creature too late. Had the sedentary plains agrarian become a nomadic equestrian a hundred years earlier, or been left alone a century longer, the history of the west might well have been different.

From the beginning the Indians of the northeast coast appear to have recognized the value of wooden ships. Unlike the mustang, the ship must be made by man and the Indian was not yet at the stage where he could make planked wooden vessels. This was his handicap. Otherwise he appears to have stood on the threshold of becoming a seaman as daring and resourceful as the Polynesian. Lacking building knowledge and material, he was forced to take his vessels by storm. Had he had time and seclusion there is little doubt that he would have become a seafaring man. At the close of this history he had changed his culture, like the Plains people, to the point where he was becoming a nomadic seafarer as the man on the plains became a wandering horseman. Had he time, the small but annoying splash he created as a fighting man at sea and a seaman might have become a tidal wave. In two hundred and twenty-five years, he stood close to the threshold which it took the plains people three hundred years and more to cross.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. James P. Howley, *The Beothuks or Red Indians*, Cambridge, 1915, pp. 32-33.
2. N. Denys, *The Description and Natural History of the Coasts of North America*, ed. W. F. Ganong (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1908) pp. 420-422.
3. For a complete and excellent description of this type see, Wendell S. Hadlock and Ernest S. Dodge, "A Canoe From The Penobscot River," *The American Neptune*, Vol. VIII. No. 4, 1948. For an earlier account of these and Malecite canoes and the uses to which they were put see, John Giles, *Memoirs of Odd Adventures, Strange Deliverances etc. In The Captivity of John Giles*; Boston, 1736.
4. Roger Williams, *Key to the Indian Language*, in *Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society*, Providence, R.I., 1827, Vol. I, pp. 98-99.
5. "Giovanni Da Verrazzano and His Discoveries In North America, 1524," in *American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society*, Albany, 1910, Vol. 15, pp. 192-193.
6. Regina Flannery, *An Analysis of Coastal Algonquin Culture*, Washington, 1939, pp. 58-62.
7. Howley, op. cit., p. 152. "They use the same type of skin canoes in the interior as others."
8. Silas T. Rand, *Legends of the Micmacs*, New York, 1894, p. 197.
9. Giles, op. cit., p. 20.
10. Harley Stamp, "Malecite Tale," *JAF.*, 1915, 28:243-248, p. 247.
11. Frank G. Speck, *Beothuk and Micmac*, Museum of the American Indian Heye Foundation, New York, 1922, pp. 33-60.
12. E. Jack, "Malecite Legends," *JAF.*, 1895, 8:30, pp. 193-208, p. 200.
13. Williams, op. cit. It is to be noted that Verrazzano, a century earlier says that they went only with "the broad oar."
14. Howley, op. cit., p. 33.
15. Lescarbot, II, p. 309.
16. Denys, op. cit., p. 422.
17. John Josselyn, *An Account of Two Voyages to New England etc.* 2nd ed., London, 1675, p. 27.
18. For an account of these wanderings see, Giles op. cit.
19. James Rosier, *A True Relation etc.* in George P. Winship, *Sailor's Narratives of Voyages Along The New England Coast 1524-1624*, Boston, 1905, pp. 148-9.
20. Charles E. Banks, *History of Martha's Vineyard*, Boston, 1911, Vol. VI, p. 340.
21. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, in *Collections of The Maine Historical Society*, Portland, 1900, Series 2, Vol. X, p. 347.
For a full account of these harpoons and manner of taking whales see O. T. Mason, *Aboriginal American Harpoons*, Report of the U.S. National Museum, 1900, pp. 193-304.
22. Howley, op. cit., p. 5.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
25. Henry F. Howe, *Prologue to New England*, New York, 1943, p. 56.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
28. Samuel G. Drake, *Old Indian Chronicle, Being A Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts Published in the Time of King Philips War by Persons Residing in the Country*, Boston, 1867, pp. 13-14.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
30. Captain John Smith, *A Description of New England*, in *Old South Leaflets*, General Series, Vol. 5, No. 121, p. 432.
31. There seems to be some conflict in the report of this lost Frenchman for, although later accounts say that all but one of the crew (who chose to marry a native woman) were killed, Thomas Dermer, who was himself captured and very nearly murdered by the Indians south of Cape Cod and, after escaping, appears to have carried on a running battle with the Indians almost all the way to Virginia, states, "Here (Massachusetts Bay) I redeemed a Frenchman, and afterwards another at Mastachusit, who three years since escaped ship-wracke at the North-east of Cape Cod." Winship, op. cit., p. 252. It seems reasonable to assume that this is the same vessel and if that be the case then the natives do not appear to have been as savage in their treatment of seamen as they were a year or so later.

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32. Thomas Morton, *New English Caanan*, Bk. 3, ch. viii, in Peter Force, *Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the Colonies in North America to the Year 1776*, n.d., V 2. Boston.

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33. Increase Mather, *Early History of New England*, Boston, 1864, p. 83.
34. Drake, op. cit., p. 25.
35. Nathaniel Morton, *New England's Memorial*, 5th ed., Boston, 1826, pp. 174-5.
36. John Winthrop, *Journal of*, Hartford, p. 50.
37. Thomas Cobbet, "A Narrative of New England's Deliverances," in *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Boston, 1853, Vol. VII, p. 211.
38. Nathaniel Morton, *New England's Memorial*. V ed., Boston, 1826, pp. 112-115, 120-122, 185. See also, Thomas Morton, *New English Caanan*, in Peter Force, op. cit., V 2.
39. William Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars in New England from the First Settlement to the Termination of the War with King Philip 1677*, in *Woodward's Historical Series*, Roxbury, Mass. MDCCCLXV, No. IV, V. 2, p. 11.
40. Thomas Cobbet, op. cit., p. 211.
41. Mather, op. cit., p. 166.
42. Ibid.
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44. Josselyn, op. cit., pp. 125-126.
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48. Hubbard, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 102.
49. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Vol. VI, p. 94.
50. Ibid., p. 100.
51. Ibid., p. 376.
52. Hubbard, op. cit., p. 174.
53. Ibid.
54. Drake, op. cit., p. 209.
55. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Series 2, Vol. VI, p. 376.
56. Ibid., p. 204.
57. Joseph B. Felt, op. cit., p. 213.
58. Increase Mather, op. cit., p. 235.
See also J. B. Felt, op. cit., p. 214.
59. Mather, op. cit., p. 237.
60. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Vol. VI, pp. 391-393.
61. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 378.

CHAPTER III

62. Samuel Sewell, *The Diary of*, Vol. 5, p. 225.
63. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Vol. IX, Ser. 2, p. 124.
64. Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 489-90.
65. Ibid., p. 489.
66. Ibid., p. 339.
67. Ibid., p. 349.
68. Ibid., p. 372.
69. Ibid., p. 435.
70. Ibid., pp. 350-51.
71. Ibid., p. 356.
72. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 16.
73. Giles, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

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74. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 40.
75. J. B. Felt, op. cit., p. 215.
76. Maine Historical Society, op. cit., Vol. V. Series 2, p. 128.
77. We have considerable evidence from Sewall's Diary and the minutes of the Massachusetts House of Representatives to attest to the courage of the man. Sewall, Vol. 5, p. 330.
78. Ibid., p. 184.
79. Sewall, Vol. 5, p. 317.
80. Ibid., p. 321.
81. Ibid., p. 291.
82. Ibid., p. 338.
83. John Frost, *Indian Wars of the United States*, Phila., 1855, pp. 72-3.
84. J. B. Felt, op. cit., p. 244.
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88. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, op. cit., p. 449.
89. Felt, op. cit., p. 214.
90. Collections of The Maine Historical Society, *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Vol. IX, p. 164.
91. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Vol. X, p. 90.
92. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Vol. X, p. 99.
93. Felt, op. cit., p. 216 and Sewall, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 57. One can hardly help regretting the fact that we have so many particulars concerning dates and ownerships and so few actual details.
94. Sewall, Vol. V, p. 89.
95. Drake, *Book of the Indians*, op cit. Book iii, p. 105; *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Vol. IX, p. 151; Giles, op. cit., p. 60.
96. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, op. cit., p. 153.
97. *Boston News Letter*, No. 25, October 2-9, 1704.
98. *Boston News Letter*, May, 1708.
99. Joseph B. Felt, *Annals of Salem*, Salem, 1849, 2nd ed., p. 215.
100. *Publications of The Champlain Society*, "Relation of The Voyage To Port Royal in Acadia or New France," Toronto, no date, p. 210.
101. *Boston News Letter*, 1711, No. 376.
102. *Boston News Letter*, No. 381.
103. *Boston News Letter*, No. 427.
104. Sewall, Vol. 6, p. 318.
105. Ibid., p. 321.
106. Cotton Mather, *The Diary of Cotton Mather*, Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections, Series 7, Vol. 8, Boston, MDCCCXII, pp. 206-243.
107. *News Letter*, No. 588.
108. *News Letter*, No. 589.
109. *News Letter*, No. 590.
110. Mass. Hist. Soc., *Journal of The House of Representatives of Massachusetts*, Vol. 1, p. 48.
111. Ibid., p. 56.
112. Ibid., pp. 50-57. Aboard the frigate was William Paine with further powers to treat for the captured vessels.
113. Ibid., p. 58.
114. Mass. Hist. Soc., Vol. 3, p. 150.

CHAPTER IV

115. *Documentary History of The State of Maine*, Vol. X, p. 148.
116. John S. Barry, *The History of Massachusetts*, Boston, 1856, 2nd edition, Vol. II, p. 118. Eaton gives this date as June fifteenth and states that two hundred Indians attacked the town of St. George, burning two sloops, both large, one belonging to the company and the other to unknown parties, and the saw mill. Cyrus Eaton, *History of Thomaston, Rockland*

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- and South Thomaston, Maine From Their First Exploration, A.D. 1605; With Family Genealogies*, Hallowell, Me. 1865, Vol. I, p. 31.
117. Barry, op. cit.
 118. Ola E. Winslow, *American Broadside Verse From Imprints of the 17th and 18th Centuries*, New Haven, MDCCCCXXX, no. 54.
See also a similar poem concerned with an attack by the Indians of the northwest coast upon the *Lady Washington* in 1791 entitled "The Bold Northwestern Man" in *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. I, pp. 71-73.
 119. *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 42-55.
 120. *Boston News Letter*, Nos. 962-970.
 121. *Ibid.*, No. 973.
 122. John S. Barry, *The History of Massachusetts*, Boston, 1856, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 118. He further states that in July seventeen sail of the fishing fleet was captured by natives near Canso. (See page 120.)
 123. *Journal of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts*, Vol. I, pp. 58-60.
 124. Broadside printed by B. Green, Boston, July 25, 1722.
 125. *Journal of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts*, Vol. 1, pp. 82, 96.
 126. Eaton, op. cit., pp. 34-36.
 127. *Collections of Maine Historical Society*, Series II, Vol. X, p. 144.
 128. *Collections of Maine Historical Society*, Vol. X, p. 201.
 129. *Boston News Letter* 1069.
 130. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Series II, Vol. X, pp. 208, 212, 213.
 131. Hutchinson, *History of Massachusetts*, Vol. 2, p. 306.
 132. *Ibid.*
 133. *Boston News Letter*, 1071.
 134. *Boston News Letter*, 1071.
 135. Felt, op. cit., p. 217.
 136. *Boston News Letter*, 1072.

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137. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Series II, Vol. X, p. 28.
138. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Series II, Vol. X, p. 289.
139. *Ibid.*
140. *Maine Historical Society Collections*, Series II, Vol. X, pp. 275, 347.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
145. *Boston News Letter*, No. 1160, April 14-21.
146. *Boston News Letter*, Thurs., July 21-26.
147. *Boston News Letter*, August 25-September 1, 1726.
148. *Boston News Letter*, September 8-15, 1726.
149. *Boston News Letter*, November 3-10, 1726.
150. *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, Vol. X, p. 398.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 428.

CHAPTER VI

153. See *History of Connecticut* etc., where a sea fight between thirty to forty canoes is mentioned.
154. See *Cruising Guide*, p.
155. (Asclepias)
156. Sewall, *Diary*, May 31, 1708, June 22, 1716.

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
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